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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the period 
of time during which a covered employee must be 
paid begins when the worker engages in a principal 
activity. Donning and doffing safety gear (including 
protective clothing) required by the employer is a 
principal activity when it is an integral and indispen­
sable part of the activities for which the worker is 
employed. Such requirements are common in manu­
facturing firms. However, under section 203(o) of the 
Act an employer need not compensate a worker for 
time spent in “changing clothes” (even if it is a prin­
cipal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from 
compensable time under a bona fide collective bar­
gaining agreement applicable to that worker.
The interrelated questions presented are:
(1) What constitutes “changing clothes” with­
in the meaning of section 203(o)?
(2) If a worker’s actions are a principal ac­
tivity but fall within the scope of the section 
203(o) exemption, do those actions nonethe­
less commence the period of time during 
which (aside from the clothes-changing time) 
the worker must be compensated?
(3) If a worker engages in a principal ac­
tivity which is not exempted by section 
203(o), but which involves only a de minimis 
amount of time, does the activity nonetheless 
commence the period of time during which 
the worker must be compensated?
PARTIES
The petitioners are approximately eight hundred 
current or former employees at the United States 
Steel’s Gary (Indiana) Works and several other 
plants, who brought or joined this action asserting 
that their employer failed to compensate them for all 
the hours they worked, as required by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.
The respondent is the United States Steel Corpo­
ration.
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1Petitioners Clifton Sandifer, et al., respectfully 
pray that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to re­
view the judgment and opinion of the United States 
Court of Appeals entered on May 8, 2012.
--------------♦--------------
OPINIONS BELOW
The May 8, 2012 opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
which is reported at 678 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012), is 
set out at pp. la-20a of the Appendix. The June 11, 
2012 order of the Court of Appeals denying rehearing 
en banc, which is not reported, is set out at p. 82a of 
the Appendix. The January 5, 2010 Opinion and 
Order of the District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana, which is unofficially reported at 2010 WL 
61971 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2010), is set out at pp. 21a- 
33a of the Appendix. The October 15, 2009 Opinion 
and Order of the District Court for the Northern 
District of Indiana, which is unofficially reported at 
2009 WL 3430222 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009), is set out 
at pp. 34a-81a of the Appendix.
--------------------- ♦----------------------
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered 
on May 8, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc was denied on June 11, 2012. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
AND REGULATION INVOLVED
Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), provides:
In determining for the purposes of sections 
206 and 207 of this title the hours for which 
an employee is employed, there shall be ex­
cluded any time spent in changing clothes or 
washing at the beginning or end of each 
workday which was excluded from measured 
working time during the week involved by 
the express terms of or by custom or practice 
under a bona fide collective-bargaining agree­
ment applicable to the particular employee.
Section 254(a) of 29 U.S.C., section 4 of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, no employer shall be subject to any 
liability or punishment under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938...on account of the 
failure of such employer to pay an employee 
minimum wages, or to pay an employee over­
time compensation, for or on account of any 
of the following activities of such employee 
engaged in on or after May 14, 1947 -
(1) Walking, riding, or traveling to and 
from the actual place of performance of 
the principal activity or activities which 
such employee is employed to perform, 
and
3(2) activities which are preliminary to 
or postliminary to said principal activity
or activities,
\
which occur either prior to the time on which 
any particular workday at which such em­
ployee commences, or subsequent to the time 
on any particular workday at which he ceases, 
such principal activity or activities.
Section 790.8(c) of 29 C.F.R. provides in pertinent 
part:
Among the activities included as an integral 
part of a principal activity are those closely 
related activities which are indispensable to 
its performance. If an employee in a chemical 
plant, for example, cannot perform his prin­
cipal activities without putting on certain 
clothes [footnote], changing clothes on the 
employer’s premises at the beginning and 
end of the workday would be an integral part 
of the employee’s principal activity. On the 
other hand, if changing clothes is merely a 
convenience to the employee and not directly 
related to his principal activities, it would 
be considered as a “preliminary” or “post­
liminary” activity rather than a principal 
part of the activity.
(footnote omitted). The footnote (numbered 65), in­
serted following the phrase “certain clothes,” provides 
in pertinent part:
Such a situation may exist where the chang­
ing of clothes on the employer’s premises is
4required by law, by rules of the employer, or 
by the nature of the work.
-------------------- ♦--------------------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In many industries workers are required to wear 
various forms of safety gear. Those requirements 
frequently derive from the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act. The lower courts are divided regarding 
how the time required to put on and take off the re­
quired safety items affects the workers’ right to com­
pensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. This 
case presents the three inter-related circuit conflicts 
that have arisen involving this problem.
(1) This case arose primarily at the Gary Works 
of the United States Steel Corporation; several of the 
plaintiffs work at other U.S.Steel plants in Michigan 
or Illinois. The Gary Works is the largest integrated 
steel mill in North America. The plant occupies some 
4,000 acres and employs approximately 5,000 workers, 
of whom 4,500 are production and maintenance 
workers represented by the United Steelworkers of 
America. The union workers enter the plant through 
one of seven assigned gates, go to one of several 
locker rooms where they put on safety gear, and then 
proceed to their work stations; at the end of the day 
the workers travel back to their assigned washroom 
and remove the safety gear, which remains at the 
plant. Because of the size of the plant, some workers 
travel to and from their work stations on buses.
5The time which individual workers spent don­
ning and doffing the safety gear, and traveling from 
the locker rooms to their work stations, is significant, 
and can total several hours per week. The amount 
of time varies significantly from worker to worker. 
U.S.Steel only pays the workers, however, for the 
time that they are at their work stations.
This action concerns whether under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act the workers are entitled to be 
paid as well for the time they spend putting on and 
taking off (“donning and doffing”) their safety equip­
ment (the donning and doffing claim) and the time 
they spend traveling between the locker rooms and 
their work stations (the travel-time claim). Because 
the workers spend 40 hours a week at their work 
stations, the donning and doffing time and the travel 
time — if compensable -  would be overtime. (App. 
38a).
The safety gear, all of which is worn on the 
person, includes three distinct types of items. First, 
there are three things that resemble ordinary cloth­
ing, but have special safety-related elements: fire 
retardant jackets, fire retardant pants, and meta­
tarsal (steel toed) boots. Second, the workers wear 
protective items that would not usually be described 
as clothes and that are generally available and uti­
lized in a wide variety of other circumstances: protec­
tive goggles, ear plugs, and hard hats. Third, the 
workers put on several types of safety gear that do 
not resemble ordinary clothing and that have been 
specially fashioned for the particular dangers of the
6Gary Works steel plant: (1) a flame retardant or 
aluminized “snood,” a head covering similar to the 
flash hood worn by Navy and Coast Guard gun crews, 
designed to protect the head and neck from flames 
and molten metal,1 (2) a flame-retardant “wristlet,” 
which covers the forearm from the elbow to the hand, 
and is designed to protect the wrist from flames or 
molten metal, and (3) flame-retardant spats, designed 
to prevent molten-metal from falling into the boots. 
(App. 4a-6a, 37a-38a). Most workers wear all of this 
equipment.
(2) Sandifer and several other employees at the 
Gary Works brought this action under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in federal district court. Ultimately ap­
proximately 800 other current or former Gary Works 
employees joined in the collective action against 
United States Steel. The plaintiffs sought compensa­
tion for two types of time during which they had been 
at the Works but were not compensated: the time 
donning and doffing the safety gear and the time 
traveling between the locker rooms and their work 
stations.
United States Steel moved for summary judg­
ment. The District Court granted summary judgment 
dismissing the donning and doffing claim, but refused 
to dismiss the travel-time claim.
1 There is a woman’s bag-like device of the same name used 
to hold one’s hair. A hair “snood” rhymes with “food”; the safety 
item in this case rhymes with “good.”
7The donning and doffing claim turns on the 
meaning of section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). Putting on and taking off 
required safety equipment would, at least ordinarily, 
be activities for which a worker would be entitled to 
compensation under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c). 
Section 203(o), however, states that where an appli­
cable collective bargaining agreement so provides an 
employer need not compensate a worker for time 
spent “changing clothes.” The collective bargaining 
agreement applicable to the plaintiffs in this case 
did not include compensation for the period when the 
workers don and doff the safety equipment. The con­
trolling legal question is whether the donning and 
doffing of that safety equipment constitutes “chang­
ing clothes.” The District Court held that all the 
safety equipment at issue constitutes “clothes” within 
the meaning of section 203(o). (App. 44a-50a). The 
court also concluded that the phrase “changing 
clothes” in section 203(o) is not limited to substituting 
one item for another (e.g., changing shoes), but also 
included putting on additional items (e.g., putting on 
wristlets, snoods).2 (App. 50a-52a).
The travel-time claim turned on the inter­
relationship between section 203(o) and section 
254(a), which provides that a worker must be com­
pensated for time spent traveling between “principal
2 The plaintiffs asserted that they put on the flame retard­
ant jacket and pants over their street clothes.
8activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The district court 
concluded that the time spent donning and doffing 
the safety gear could constitute a “principal activity,” 
so that the time spent traveling from the locker room 
to the individual work stations (and back) would be 
time traveling between principal activities. (App. 62a- 
64a). U.S.Steel argued, however, that if the donning 
and doffing was non-compensable under section 
203(o), it necessarily followed that the travel time 
too must be non-compensable. The District Court 
rejected that contention. (App. 62a-64a).
On appeal3 the Seventh Circuit upheld the dis­
missal of the donning and doffing claim and con­
cluded that the travel-time claim should also have 
been dismissed.
The Court of Appeals held that special protective 
safety clothes, even if “different in kind from typical 
clothing,” is still clothing within the meaning of sec­
tion 203(o), expressly rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to the contrary in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds sub 
nom. IBP, Inc v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). (App.
3 The District Court certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) an 
interlocutory appeal by U.S.Steel regarding the travel-time is­
sue. The Seventh Circuit on appeal also reviewed the District 
Court’s determination regarding the donning and doffing issue, 
because plaintiffs’ argument that the donning and doffing was 
not “changing clothes” under section 203(o) provided an alterna­
tive basis for affirming the District Court decision regarding the 
travel-time claim. (App. 3a).
910a) (quoting Alvarez). It also concluded, however, 
that not all of the safety gear in this case was 
“clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o). Under 
that provision, the appellate court held, “clothes” is 
limited to items that are “clothing in the ordinary 
sense,” something that would generally be “regarded 
as an article of clothing.” (App. 6a). Under that inter­
pretation of section 203(o), the court of appeals con­
cluded, the glasses and ear plugs (and perhaps the 
hard hat) were not clothes. The Seventh Circuit 
nonetheless held that the donning and doffing claim 
was properly dismissed, reasoning that time required 
to put on and take off the non-clothes items was de 
minimis and thus not compensable under the FLSA. 
(Id.).
The Seventh Circuit rejected the travel-time 
claim as well, holding that the district judge should 
have granted U.S.Steel’s motion for summary judg­
ment regarding that claim. It agreed that in the 
absence of section 203(o) the donning and doffing of 
the safety gear would have been a “principal activity” 
under section 254(a), which would have meant that 
the workers were entitled to be paid for the travel 
time between the locker rooms (where they put on 
and took off the gear) and their work stations. (App. 
11a). But, the Court of Appeals held, in a case in 
which the donning and doffing is non-compensable 
because of section 203(o), the donning and doffing 
cannot constitute a “principal activity” under section 
254(a). (App. lla-17a). The Seventh Circuit expressly 
rejected the contrary holding of the Sixth Circuit in
10
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010). 
(App. 17a). In the instant case the Seventh Circuit 
itself had held that some of the donning and doffing 
(e.g., of the eye glasses and ear plugs) was not cov­
ered by section 203(o); it concluded, however, that the 
time required for putting on and taking off these non­
clothes items was de minimis, and thus not sufficient 
to start the work day and render compensable the 
travel time at issue.
Plaintiffs filed a timely petition for rehearing en 
banc. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on 
June 11, 2012. (App. 82a).
-------------------------- 4 ---------------------------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A large number of employers require their work­
ers to wear safety gear while on the job. Those re­
quirements are particularly important and common 
in plants that process raw materials, dangerous 
chemicals, or food. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 
21 (2005). At least ordinarily the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act requires that workers be compensated 
for the time (unless de minimis) they spend donning 
and doffing such safety gear, as well as for the time 
the workers spend traveling from where they don 
and doff that gear to their work stations.
Unionized plants, however, are subject to a spe­
cial provision which has given rise to widespread liti­
gation in and disagreements among the lower courts. 
Under section 203(o), if an applicable collective
11
bargaining agreement so provides, an employer need 
not compensate workers for time spent “changing 
clothes.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). The circuit courts are 
divided regarding three inter-related issues: (1) when 
if  at all is donning and doffing safety gear “changing 
clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o); (2) if all 
of the donning and doffing is non-compensable under 
section 203(o), does it nonetheless constitute a “prin­
cipal activity” under the FLSA and thus begin the 
continuous work day, so that travel time to and from 
an employee’s work station must be compensated; 
and (3) can donning and doffing, even if it is not 
“changing clothes” within the meaning of section 
203(o), constitute a principal activity if it requires 
only a de minimis amount of time.
This case presents all three circuit conflicts. The 
Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledged that “courts 
of appeals...have reached varied conclusion on the 
issues presented by this appeal” (App. 20a). The Court 
of Appeals below clearly recognized that its decision 
conflicted with decisions in the Ninth and Sixth 
Circuits, and expressed its emphatic disagreements 
with those other circuit courts. (App. 9a, 10a, 17a).
Many of the major unionized employers affected 
by these issues, including U.S.Steel, have plants in 
several different circuits, and thus may be subject to 
inconsistent legal standards. Several of the plaintiffs 
in this case work at a U.S.Steel plant in Ohio, where 
(had they filed suit there rather than joining the 
instant case) the Sixth Circuit decision in Franklin 
would have resulted in a favorable ruling on their
12
travel-time claim. The situation is in some circum­
stances compounded by the existence of national 
collective bargaining agreements, which may have 
differing legal consequences at different plants. These 
considerations give added force to the need to resolve 
these circuit conflicts.
I. There Is An Important Circuit Conflict 
Regarding The Scope of The “Changing 
Clothes” Provision in Section 203(o) of 
The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Seventh Circuit decision in the instant case 
exacerbates what was already an entrenched circuit 
conflict regarding the meaning of the phrase “chang­
ing clothes” in section 203(o). Four circuits hold that 
“clothes” includes anything that can be worn on the 
person, even “accessories.” The Ninth Circuit has 
ruled that “special protective gear different in kind 
from typical clothing” is not clothes under section 
203(o). Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 905. In the instant case 
the Seventh Circuit has adopted yet a third interpre­
tation of section 203(o).
The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
hold that “clothes” includes anything an individual 
“wears,” including any “accessories.” Salazar v. 
Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“all the garments and accessories worn by a per­
son at any one time”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 
F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen 
Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2009);
13
Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955 (11th Cir. 
2007). Thus the Tenth Circuit in Salazar held that 
knife scabbards are “clothes” because they are “quite 
similar to ordinary...holsters.” 644 F.3d at 1140. In 
those circuits the controlling standard is whether a 
safety item is something the worker can “wear.” In its 
appellate brief U.S.Steel urged the Seventh Circuit to 
adopt that construction of section 203(o), under which 
all of the safety gear in this case would constitute 
“clothes.”4
The Seventh Circuit rejected that broad interpre­
tation of section 203(o). The panel insisted “that not 
everything a person wears is clothing. We say that a 
person ‘wears’ glasses, or a watch,...but this just 
shows that ‘wear’ is a word of many meanings.” (App. 
7a). Applying this standard, the panel held that 
“clothes” does not include earplugs or safety glasses. 
(App. 6a). The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits, utilizing a decidedly broader definition of 
“clothes,” have held, to the contrary, that safety 
glasses and ear plugs are indeed “clothes” under sec­
tion 203(o). Salazar, 644 F.3d at 1134; Franklin, 619 
F.3d at 614; Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 216; Anderson, 
488 F.3d at 949; see App. 18a (noting that the Labor 
Department’s 2002 interpretation of “clothes” was 
“broader” than that adopted by the panel).
4 Reply/Response Brief of Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee 
United States Steel Corp., pp. 12-22.
14
The Ninth Circuit applies a much narrower in­
terpretation of section 203(o) “clothes.” In that Cir­
cuit this term does not include “specialized protective 
gear...different in kind from typical clothing.” 339 
F.3d at 905. The Ninth Circuit utilizes a distinction 
drawn in OSHA regulations between ordinary cloth­
ing (including work clothes) and personal protective 
equipment, “materials worn by an individual to pro­
vide a barrier against exposure to workplace haz­
ards.” Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b).5
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit 
holding in Alvarez that if an item is required and 
fashioned for safety reasons it necessarily cannot be 
“clothes” within the meaning of section 203(o). (App. 
6a). Under the Seventh Circuit standard an item is 
“clothes” for purposes of section 203(o) if it would be 
“regarded as an article of clothing” (App. 6a) by 
“[ajlmost any English speaker.” (App. 7a). The fact 
that the gear might have been fashioned in some 
special manner to serve a safety purpose -  for exam­
ple, the fact that the pants or jacket are flame retard­
ant -  does not remove that item from coverage as 
“clothes” under the decision below.
5 That regulation provides:
Personal Protective Equipment is specialized clothing 
or equipment worn by an employee for protection 
against a hazard. General work clothes (e.g., uniforms, 
pants, shirts or blouses) not intended to function as 
protection against a hazard are not considered to be 
personal protective equipment.
15
The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Ninth 
Circuit had construed section 203(o) differently, 
holding in Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2003), that the term “clothes” in section 203(o) does 
not apply to “special protective gear different in kind 
from typical clothing.” 339 F.3d at 905. The Seventh 
Circuit commented that its interpretation of “clothes” 
did not “accord[] with...the outlier...Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Alvarez.” (App. 10a). The Seventh Cir­
cuit acknowledged that the safety gear which the 
Ninth Circuit in Alvarez held was not section 203(o) 
“clothes” was “similar to those the steelworkers wear” 
in the instant case. (Id.). The Court of Appeals was 
sharply critical of the Ninth Circuit decision in Alva­
rez.
The Ninth Circuit...thought it important that 
protective clothing...is “different in kind from 
typical clothing,” which the court instanced 
by “warm clothing.” [339 F.3d] at 905.... But 
that can’t be the end of the analysis. Since 
workers very rarely change at work from 
street clothes into street clothes, section 
203(o) would...be virtually empty if the Ninth 
Circuit were right.
(Id.). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Franklin candidly 
recognized that its construction of section 203(o) “is at 
odds with...the Ninth Circuit.” 619 F.3d at 615. The 
Eleventh Circuit in Anderson “[acknowledged that 
our conclusion conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion.” 488 F.3d at 958.
16
In arriving at its interpretation of section 203(o), 
the Seventh Circuit insisted that that provision is not 
governed by the principle that exemptions from the 
Fair Labor Standards Act are to be narrowly con­
strued. (App. 8a-9a). Section 203(o), the Court of 
Appeals insisted, is not an “exemption” at all. The 
Seventh Circuit expressly acknowledged that there is 
a circuit split regarding whether or not section 203(o) 
creates an “exemption” from the FLSA, and is thus 
subject to the narrow construction rule.
Section 203(o) creates an exclusion rather 
than an exemption, as all but one appellate 
decision to address the issue has held. See 
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130,
1138 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v. Kellogg 
Co., 619 F.3d 604, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Allen v. McWane, Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th 
Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 
945, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2007).
The outlier is Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra,
339 F.3d at 905....
(App. 9a). The Seventh Circuit was harshly critical of 
the contrary Ninth Circuit’s Alvarez in this regard. 
“[T]he Ninth Circuit seemed to have forgotten that 
subsection (o) of section 203 is not found in the sec­
tion of the FLSA that creates exemptions.” (App. 10a).
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II. There Is An Important Circuit Conflict Re­
garding Whether Section 203(o) Exempt 
Donning and Doffing Can Constitute A “Prin­
cipal Activity” Under Section 254(a) and 
Thus Start The Beginning of A Work Day
The lower courts are also divided regarding whether 
section 203(o) affects whether “changing clothes” 
within the scope of that provision can mark the be­
ginning (and end) of a work day, thus entitling the 
employee to compensation for the period that follows.
Under section 254(a), a worker is entitled to com­
pensation for time spent “walking, riding, or traveling 
to and from the actual place of performance of the 
principal activity or activities which such employee is 
employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). Any 
action required of a worker is a “principal activity” if 
it is an “integral and indispensable part of the princi­
pal activities” for which the employee is employed. 
Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1956). Once 
a worker has engaged in a principal activity, all sub­
sequent walking and other travel is outside the scope 
of section 254(a)(1) until the end of the work day, 
similarly delineated by the occurrence of the last 
“principal activity.” In the instant case the plaintiffs 
contended that donning and doffing the safety gear 
constituted a principal activity under section 254(a)(1), 
thus entitling the plaintiffs to compensation for time 
that they thereafter spent traveling to and from their 
work stations.
The Seventh Circuit agreed that donning and 
doffing required safety equipment (at least but for
18
section 203(o)) would be a principal activity. “If an 
employer requires his employees to don and doff work 
clothes at the workplace, then donning and doffing 
are an integral and indispensable part of the workers’ 
main activity...and therefore a principal activity.” 
(App. 12a). Absent section 203(o), the lower court 
agreed, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to 
compensation for their travel time. The Court of Ap­
peals acknowledged that “[h]ad the clothes-changing 
time in this case not been rendered noncompensable 
pursuant to section 203(o), it would have been a 
principal activity.” (App. 11a).
The panel held, however, that donning and 
doffing that would otherwise constitute a principal 
activity is not a principal activity under section 
254(a)(1) if it is noncompensable under section 203(o). 
(App. lla-18a). The panel reasoned that because 
section 203(o) controls whether a worker is “em­
ployed” under section 206 and 207, it logically must 
also determine whether the worker is engaged in a 
principal activity under section 254(a)(1).
[T]he employer and the union decided...that 
changing time is not work time and need not 
be compensated. If it is not work time...how 
can it be one of the “principal...activities 
which [the] employee is employed to per­
form”? [H]e is not employed to...change 
clothes.
(App. lla-12a; see id. 13a (“[s]ection 203(o) permits 
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to 
reclassify changing time as nonworking time”)).
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The Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledged that 
its interpretation of the interrelationship between 
sections 203(o) and 254(a) had been expressly rejected 
by the Sixth Circuit.
In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618- 
19 (6th Cir. 2010), as in this case, the em­
ployer, invoking section 203(o), did not pay 
its workers for time spent changing into 
work clothes. The court concluded neverthe­
less that changing time, because required by 
the employer, was a “principal activity.”
(App. 17a). “[B]y disagreeing with Franklin we...cre­
ate an inter-circuit conflict.” (Id.). The Court of Ap­
peals was sharply critical of the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Franklin. “This seems clearly wrong...and 
the Franklin opinion offers only a conclusion, not 
reasons.” (Id.).
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit in Franklin noted 
that “ ‘[t]he courts have taken divergent views’ on the 
issue of whether activities deemed excluded under 
§ 203(o) may still constitute ‘principal activities.’ ” 619 
F.3d at 618. That circuit reasoned that “Section 203(o) 
relates to the compensability of time spent donning 
[and] doffing.... It does not render such time any more 
or less integral or indispensable to an employee’s 
job.” Id. (quoting Andrako v. U.S.Steel Corp., 632 
F.Supp.2d 398, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (emphasis in orig­
inal)).
This conflict is of great importance to the practi­
cal consequences of section 203(o). If, as the several
20
courts of appeals have held, the donning and doffing 
of safety gear is within the scope of section 203(o), 
workers who put on such items at large plants will 
often if not ordinarily travel for a significant period of 
time to reach their work station.
III. The Decision of The Seventh Circuit Con­
flicts With The Decision of The First Cir­
cuit in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., and The 
Decision of This Court in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez
The Seventh Circuit correctly acknowledged that 
the donning and doffing of required safety gear, if 
outside the scope of section 203(o), would constitute a 
principal activity and therefore entitle a worker to 
compensation for travel time that occurred after he or 
she put on, and until he or she took off, such items. 
The Court of Appeals also held that at least some of 
the safety equipment in the instant case did not con­
stitute “clothing” within the scope of section 203(o). 
The court below nonetheless held that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to compensation for travel time 
after they donned, and before they doffed, those non­
clothes items.
That holding is inconsistent with this Court’s 
decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, and with the First 
Circuit decision in Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), which in this Court was consol­
idated and decided with Alvarez. In Turn the workers 
at a poultry processing plant were required to put on 
certain safety equipment (including, as in the instant
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case, safety glasses and ear plugs6) at the beginning 
of the work day. The district court concluded that 
donning and doffing that equipment was a principal 
activity, but at trial the jury concluded that the 
donning and doffing were non-compensable because 
the amount of time involved was de minimis. 546 
U.S. at 39. This Court nonetheless held that workers 
were entitled to compensation for the walking time 
that followed the donning (or picking up of) that 
equipment. 546 U.S. at 527.
The question of whether a de minimis principal 
activity could trigger the start of the work day — thus 
rendering compensable any subsequent travel -  was 
expressly before this Court in Alvarez. In the earlier 
First Circuit proceedings, Chief Judge Boudin, in a 
concurring opinion, had argued that the donning of 
required equipment ought not constitute a principal 
activity, thus rendering compensable subsequent walk­
ing time, if the time required to put on that equip­
ment was de minimis. Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 
F.3d 274, 285-86 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc) (concurring 
opinion). The government successfully argued in this 
Court that “th[e] de minimis rule...has nothing to do 
with whether an activity begins or ends the workday 
for purposes of the Portal Act.”7 As the United States
6 See Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
7 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 04-66, 
p. 25, available at 2005 WL 1185927. This issue was also ad­
dressed in the Brief for Petitioner, pp. 41-46, available at 2005
(Continued on following page)
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pointed out in that brief, under the terms of the 
Department of Labor regulations principal activity 
involving “any amount of time” will begin the work 
day under the Portal-to-Portal Act. See 29 C.F.R. 
790.8(b) n.63. The Department of Labor filed this 
brief during the Bush administration, and its position 
on this issue has not varied.
The Seventh Circuit expressed disapproval for 
the very idea that a worker could be entitled to com­
pensation for time traveling from a locker to his or 
her place on the production line. “Employers could 
emasculate...the ‘primary activity’ provision by plac­
ing the locker rooms in the work stations, for then 
there would be no post-primary-activity travel time.... 
What sense would that make?” (App. 14a) (emphasis 
in original). “There is something amiss with an 
interpretation that implies that the location of the 
locker room...determines one’s statutory entitlement 
to compensation.” (Id.). This very objection, however, 
was made by one o f the lower court opinions in Turn,8 
and was unsuccessfully advanced in this Court by 
both employers.9
WL 1185926, and the Brief of the National Chicken Council as 
Amicus Curiae, pp. 22-25, available at 2005 WL 1841384.
8 Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 360 F.3d 274, 280 (majority 
opinion), 285 (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc); 
Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
9 Brief for Respondent, No. 04-66, pp. 40-41, available at 
2005 WL 1841383; Brief for Petitioner, No. 03-1238, pp. 32-36, 
available at 2005 WL 1185925.
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IV. The Decision of The Seventh Circuit Is 
Clearly Incorrect
(1) The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in 
Alvarez that the “clothes” referred to in section 203(o) 
do not include safety gear intended to protect the 
wearer from some unusual workplace hazard.
In ordinary parlance “clothes” refers to items 
people put on to deal with the common needs and 
interests of dressing on a day to day basis: assuring 
modesty, providing protection from normal variations 
in temperature, creating a particular appearance, 
and responding to the likely degree of dirt or precipi­
tation to be encountered. In that sense people change 
clothes because they are going out to dinner, because 
they are going to garden, or because the temperature 
has gotten hotter or colder. Similarly, an employee 
might change clothes to create a particular appear­
ance (e.g., a police officer’s uniform) or to work in a 
dirty environment without soiling one’s street clothes 
(e.g., a garage mechanic’s coverall). This use of 
“changing clothes” is far different from putting on 
special protective gear like a hazmat suit, a beehive 
keepers suit, or a deep sea diver’s suit. It would, at 
the least, be odd to describe those events as “changing 
clothes.”
The Ninth Circuit decision establishes a work­
able rule, declining to treat safety gear as clothes if 
they are intended to guard against some workplace 
hazard unlike the problems of ordinary life. The ma­
jority rule, insisting on treating as clothes anything
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that a worker can “wear,” implausibly includes all 
sorts of things no one would describe as clothes, such 
as glasses, earplugs, respirators, or even hazmat 
suits. The Seventh Circuit rule, though less extreme, 
entails intractable problems of interpretation. In this 
case, for example, a court would have to decide 
whether ordinary English speakers would label as 
clothes such things as a “snood” or “wristlet” -  devices 
so novel that the employer had to invent names for 
them -  and to decide when the safety modifications of 
a particular item had gone so far that it would no 
longer be described as clothes in ordinary conversa­
tion. In the poultry industry, for example, aprons and 
gloves are made of the modern equivalent of chain 
mail. The Ninth Circuit rule in Alvarez avoids these 
difficulties.
In addition, much of the safety gear that would 
be treated as “clothes” under the majority and Sev­
enth Circuit standards is put on over, or added to, 
street clothes. In the instant case plaintiffs contend 
that is true of all the items in question except the 
boots. Because of the different manner in which 
safety gear is used, the lower courts which treat these 
items as “clothes” have been forced to hold that 
putting on an additional item — rather than, for 
example, substituting work pants for street pants -  
is changing clothes. Thus in most circuits putting in 
ear plugs is “changing clothes,” and in the Seventh 
Circuit putting on a “snood” is “changing clothes.” 
That conclusion is clearly inconsistent with ordinary 
usage.
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(2) Whether donning and doffing fall within the 
scope of section 203(o) is irrelevant to whether those 
actions constitute principal activities under section 
254(a).
Section 203(o) expressly states that a collec­
tive bargaining agreement that changing clothes (or 
washing) is not to be compensated is controlling “[i]n 
determining for the purposes of section 206 and 207 
of this title the hours for which an employee is em­
ployed.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). Section 203(o) by its own 
terms simply does not apply or even refer to determi­
nations under section 254(a)(1) as to whether an 
employee is engaged in a principal activity. When 
Congress wanted to permit the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement to control whether a worker’s 
actions could constitute a “principal activity” for pur­
poses of section 254(a)(1), it did so expressly. Con­
gress included just such a provision in section 254(a), 
but it is limited to the use of a collective bargaining 
agreement to determine whether a worker engages in 
a principal activity when, on the way to or from work 
in an employer owned vehicle, he or she does some 
“incidental” work.
For the purposes of this subsection, the use of 
an employer’s vehicle for travel by an em­
ployee and activities performed by an em­
ployee which are incidental to the use of such 
vehicle for commuting shall not be consid­
ered part of the employee’s principal activi­
ties if the use of such vehicle for travel is 
within the normal commuting area for the
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employer’s business or establishment and 
the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to 
an agreement on the part of the employer 
and the employee or representative of such 
employee.
29 U.S.C. § 254 (emphasis added).
The panel also reasoned that the amendments to 
the FLSA gave labor and management negotiators 
blanket authority to “determine[]...what is compen­
sable work in borderline cases,” such as the question 
of whether “walking from a locker room to a work 
station [is] ‘work.’ ” (App. 15a). But neither the FLSA, 
the Portal-to-Portal Act, nor any other amendment to 
the FLSA gives to labor and management negotiators 
any such general authority to decide -  in place of the 
federal courts that ordinarily are responsible for ap­
plying federal statutes and regulations — what con­
stitutes compensable work in “borderline cases.” 
The FLSA and its amendments permit an employer’s 
FLSA responsibilities to be affected by a collective 
bargaining agreement only in limited and highly 
specific circumstances. In addition to sections 203(o) 
and 254(a), seven other narrowly framed provisions of 
the FLSA provide that an employer’s responsibilities 
may be reduced, or expanded, by an agreement with 
an authorized union.10 But none of these provisions
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m) (exclusion of board and lodging from 
wage), 207(b)(1) (exemption from overtime requirement), 207(b)(2) 
(same), 207(e)(7) (calculation of regular rate), 207(f) (exemption 
from overtime requirement), 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (compensatory time 
(Continued on following page)
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includes the compensability of travel time within an 
employer’s premises as one of the issues that can be 
affected by a collective bargaining agreement. (And in 
no instance does the applicability of any such pro­
vision turn on whether the matter affected involved 
a “borderline” issue). The very specificity of these 
limited provisions makes it emphatically clear that 
Congress did not intend collective bargaining agree­
ments to alter in any other circumstances a worker’s 
entitlement to compensation. The Congress which 
enacted section 203(o) expressly rejected a proposal to 
give management and labor negotiators general 
authority to bargain away rights otherwise granted 
by the FLSA.11
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals that the 
de minimis donning and doffing of non-clothes items 
outside the scope of section 203(o) does not entitle 
workers to compensation for travel time that occurs 
between the donning and doffing is squarely contrary 
to this Court’s decision in Alvarez.
-----------------♦-----------------
in lieu of overtime), 254(b) (compensation not otherwise required 
by Portal-to-Portal Act).
11 That legislative history is described in the Department of 
Labor 2010 Opinion Letter, 2010 WL 12468195.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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United States Court of Appeals 
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 10-1821, 10-1866 
Clifton Sandifer , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees! 
Cross-Appellants,
v.
U nited States Steel Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 
No. 2:07-cv-00443-RLM-PRC -  
Robert L. Miller, Jr. Judge
A rgued F ebruary 15, 2012 -  D ecided M ay 8, 2012
Before Posner , Flaum , and M an io n , Circuit 
Judges.
Posner , Circuit Judge. These appeals arise out of 
a class action (technically a “collective action,” as it is 
brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), a part of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et 
seq., rather than pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23) on
2a
behalf of 800 former and current hourly workers at 
U.S. Steel’s steel works in Gary, Indiana. The plain­
tiffs argue that U.S. Steel has violated the Act by 
failing to compensate them for the time they spend in 
putting on and taking off their work clothes in a 
locker room at the plant (“clothes-changing time”) 
and in walking from the locker room to their work 
stations, and back again at the end of the day (“travel 
time”). The collective bargaining agreement between 
U.S. Steel and the steelworkers union does not re­
quire compensation for such time, and apparently 
none of the previous collective bargaining agreements 
between U.S. Steel and the union since 1947, nine 
years after the FLSA was enacted, required it either. 
But the plaintiffs argue that the Act itself requires 
compensation; and if it does, it overrides any contrary 
contractual provision. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740-41 (1981).
The district judge ruled that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not require that the clothes- 
changing time in this case be compensated, but that 
the Act may require that the travel time be compen­
sated and he therefore refused to dismiss the suit. 
But he certified the issue of the compensability of the 
travel time for an interlocutory appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) by U.S. Steel, and we accepted the 
appeal.
The plaintiffs have cross-appealed. They want to 
challenge the district judge’s ruling that clothes- 
changing time is not compensable. U.S. Steel points 
out that the cross-appeal doesn’t satisfy the procedural
3a
standard for an appeal under section 1292(b) because 
the plaintiffs did not ask either the district judge or 
us for leave to appeal. So we hereby dismiss the cross- 
appeal. But the dismissal has no practical signifi­
cance. For if the ruling on clothes-changing time was 
erroneous, the plaintiffs’ case for compensation for 
travel time is, as we’ll see, irrefutable. And so they 
can certainly argue, in opposition to the appeal, that 
the ruling was indeed erroneous.
So on to the merits — and it will simplify exposi­
tion to start with the clothing issue. The Fair Labor 
Standards Act requires that workers be paid at least 
the federal minimum wage for all hours worked, and 
time and a half for hours worked over 40 hours in a 
week. But the statute does not define “work,” a criti­
cal hole that the courts must fill — critical because the 
Act covers an immense variety of kinds of workplace, 
and by expanding the meaning of “work” courts could 
overrule agreements negotiated between labor and 
management and create unforeseen retroactive 
liabilities. To cut back on Supreme Court decisions 
believed to have done this, Congress in 1947 passed 
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251 et seq., and 
two years later, in the spirit of that Act, added section 
3(o) to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o). That section excludes, from the time during 
which an employee is entitled to be compensated at 
the minimum hourly wage (or, if it is overtime work, 
at 150 percent of his hourly wage), “any time spent in 
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end 
of each workday which was excluded from measured
4a
working time . . .  by the express terms of or by custom 
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement applicable to the particular employee.” Id. 
(“Washing time” is not at issue in this case, however.) 
The plaintiffs argue that the section is inapplicable 
because what the district court deemed “clothes” are 
not clothes within the meaning of the Act, but rather 
safety equipment. The statute does not define 
“clothes.”
The alleged clothes consist of flame-retardant 
pants and jacket, work gloves, metatarsal boots (work 
boots containing steel or other strong material to pro­
tect the toes and instep), a hard hat, safety glasses, 
ear plugs, and a “snood” (a hood that covers the top of 
the head, the chin, and the neck). These work clothes 
are in the record, and since a picture is worth a 
thousand words, here is a photograph of a man mod­
eling the clothes:
[Picture Appears On Opposite Page]
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The glasses and ear plugs are not clothing in the 
ordinary sense but the hard hat might be regarded as 
an article of clothing, and in any event putting on the 
glasses and the hard hat and putting in the ear plugs 
is a matter of seconds and hence not compensable, 
because de minimis. “Split-second absurdities are not 
justified by the actualities of working conditions or by 
the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only 
when an employee is required to give up a substantial 
measure of his time and effort that compensable 
working time is involved.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946); see also Frank 
v. Wilson & Co., 172 F.2d 712, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1949); 
Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 372-75 
(4th Cir. 2011); id. at 376-81 (concurring opinion); 
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 903-04 (9th 
Cir. 2003), affirmed under the name of IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
The rest of the outfit certainly seems to be cloth­
ing, but the plaintiffs argue, no, it’s “personal pro­
tective equipment.” Actually it’s both. Protection -  
against sun, cold, wind, blisters, stains, insect bites, 
and being spotted by animals that one is hunting -  is 
a common function of clothing, and an especially 
common function of work clothes worn by factory 
workers. It would be absurd to exclude all work 
clothes that have a protective function from section 
203(o), and thus limit the exclusion largely to actors’ 
costumes and waiters’ and doormen’s uniforms. 
Remember that the section covers not only clothes- 
changing time but also washing-up time, and workers
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who wear work clothes for self-protection in a dan­
gerous or noxious work environment are far more 
likely to require significant time for washing up after 
work than a waiter.
It’s true that not everything a person wears is 
clothing. We say that a person “wears” glasses, or a 
watch, or his heart on his sleeve, but this just shows 
that “wear” is a word of many meanings. Almost any 
English speaker would say that the model in our 
photo is wearing work clothes. Given the subject 
matter of the Fair Labor Standards Act it would be 
beyond odd to say that the word “clothes” in section 
203(o) excludes work clothes, especially since the 
section is about changing into and out of clothes at 
the beginning and end of the workday. Not all work­
ers wear work clothes, but workers who change at the 
beginning and end of the workday are changing into 
and out of work clothes, and if they are governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement that makes such 
changing noncompensable the agreement must apply 
to work clothes, for otherwise the noncompensation 
provision would have virtually no applications.
The fact that the clothing exclusion is operative 
only if it is agreed to in collective bargaining implies, 
moreover, that workers are compensated for the time 
they spend changing into work clothes, and washing 
up and changing back. “Section 203(o) permits unions 
and management to trade off the number of compen­
sable hours against the wage rate; the workers get 
more, per hour, in exchange for agreeing to exclude 
some time from the base.” Spoerle v. Kraft Foods
8a
Global, Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 2010). The 
steelworkers would not have given up their statutory 
entitlement to time and a half for overtime, when 
changing clothes or traveling to and from their work 
stations, without receiving something in return; and 
they will get to keep that compensation until the next 
collective bargaining agreement goes into effect, in 
addition to the back pay they’re demanding, if they 
convince us that “clothes” don’t include the work 
clothes worn by steelworkers at the Gary plant.
From a worker’s standpoint any time spent on 
the factory grounds is time “at work” in the sense of 
time away from home or some other place where he 
might prefer to be if he weren’t at work. But it is not 
time during which he is making steel, and so it is not 
time for which the company will willingly pay. If the 
workers have a legal right to be paid for that time, 
the company will be less willing to pay them a high 
wage for the time during which they are making 
steel; it will push hard to reduce the hourly wage so 
that its overall labor costs do not rise. The steel 
industry is international and highly competitive, and 
unions temper their wage demands to avoid killing 
the goose that lays the golden eggs. They don’t want 
the American steel industry to go where so much 
American manufacturing has gone in recent years — 
abroad. The plaintiffs are adverse to their union, to 
the interests of other steelworkers, and to their own 
long-term interests.
The plaintiffs cite language from a number of 
cases to the effect that “exemptions” from the Fair
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Labor Standards Act are to be construed narrowly.
E.g., Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 33 (1993);
A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 
(1945). We expressed skepticism in Yi u. Sterling 
Collision Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 
2007), asking rhetorically: “Why should one provision 
in a statute take precedence over another?” No mat­
ter; section 203(o) does not create an exemption. The 
Fair Labor Standards Act has a section entitled 
“Exemptions”; it is 29 U.S.C. § 213; the exclusion of 
changing time is not in that section.
This is more than a quibble. There’s a difference 
between exclusion and exemption, or, equivalently, 
between scope and coverage. The FLSA does not 
apply to American workers abroad. Or to soldiers. Or 
to certain people who volunteer for particular kinds of 
charitable work. These exclusions help to define the 
scope of the Act. That scope is defined in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203, which is entitled “Definitions” and is where we 
find the provision concerning compensation for 
clothes-changing time, rather than in section 213, 
where instead we find exemptions for certain types of 
worker, such as certain agricultural workers. Section 
203(o) creates an exclusion rather than an exemption, 
as all but one appellate decision to address the issue 
has held. See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 
1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2011); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 
619 F.3d 604, 611-12 (6th Cir. 2010); Allen v. McWane, 
Inc., 593 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. 
Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 957-58 (11th Cir. 2007).
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The outlier is Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d 
at 905 (the affirmance of the decision by the Supreme 
Court was on other grounds). But as the Anderson 
decision points out, 488 F.3d at 957, the Ninth Circuit 
seemed to have forgotten that subsection (o) of section 
203 is not found in the section of the FLSA that 
creates exemptions. The Ninth Circuit also thought it 
important that protective clothing (the workers in 
question were employed in a meat-packing plant and 
were required to wear protective work clothes similar 
to those the steelworkers wear, see 339 F.3d at 898 
n. 2) is “different in kind from typical clothing,” which 
the court instanced by “warm clothing.” Id. at 905. 
But this was just to say that work clothes are not 
street clothes. That can’t be the end of the analysis. 
Since workers very rarely change at work from street 
clothes into street clothes, section 203(o) would as we 
said be virtually empty if the Ninth Circuit were 
right.
So the district judge was correct to rule that, 
given the terms of the collective bargaining agree­
ment, U.S. Steel doesn’t have to compensate its 
workers for the time they spend changing into and 
out of their work clothes. We add that the ruling 
accords with all but one reported appellate decision, 
and again the outlier is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Alvarez. See Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, supra, 644 
F.3d at 1136-41; Franklin v. Kellogg Co., supra, 619 
F.3d at 610-16; Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 
591 F.3d 209, 214-18 (4th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. 
Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d 945, 955-58 (11th Cir.
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2007); Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n. 3 
(5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). And in Spoerle u. Kraft 
Foods Global, Inc., supra, 614 F.3d at 428, we adopted 
Sepulveda’s reasoning and conclusion without under­
taking a separate analysis.
But the judge’s ruling that the clothes-changing 
time isn’t compensable makes his ruling that the 
company must compensate the plaintiffs for travel 
time puzzling and paradoxical (which is why, as we 
said earlier, the plaintiffs were entitled to argue 
against the judge’s ruling on clothes-changing time 
without having to cross appeal). The Portal-to-Portal 
Act exempts from the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act “walking, 
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity or activities 
which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 
U.S.C. § 254(a). Had the clothes-changing time in this 
case not been rendered noncompensable pursuant to 
section 203(o), it would have been a principal activity. 
But unless changing into and changing out of work 
clothes are principal activities even when made non­
compensable pursuant to section 203(o), the exemp­
tion in section 254(a) applies, and U.S. Steel need not 
compensate for travel time.
The judge thought that clothes-changing time 
could be a “principal activity” even though the em­
ployer and the union had decided, as he agreed they 
were entitled to do, that changing time is not work 
time and need not be compensated. If it is not work 
time -  the workers aren’t being paid and their union
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has agreed to their not being paid — how can it be one 
of the “principal. . . activities which [the] employee is 
employed to perform”? He is required to wear work 
clothes, and for that matter he is required to show 
up for work. But he is not employed to show up or 
employed to change clothes. Not all requirements im­
posed on employees constitute employment. An em­
ployee may be required to call in when he is sick, but 
unless he is on paid sick leave he is not paid for the 
time it takes to place the call.
In Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252-53 
(1956), the Supreme Court held that the term “prin­
cipal activity or activities” included all activities that 
are an “integral and indispensable part of the princi­
pal activities” for which the employee is employed, 
and the Court reaffirmed that ruling in IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at 37. If an employer re­
quires his employees to don and doff work clothes at 
the workplace, then donning and doffing are an 
integral and indispensable part of the workers’ main 
activity (in this case, making steel) and therefore a 
principal activity. Steiner v. Mitchell, supra, 350 U.S. 
at 256. Alvarez held that when this is the case the 
time the worker spends walking from the locker room 
to the worksite is not time walking to and from a 
principal activity, but instead time walking between 
principal activities, and so is not within the exemp­
tion created by the Portal-to-Portal Act, just as if the 
worker were a millwright who inspects, repairs, 
replaces, installs, adjusts, and maintains mechanical 
equipment in different parts of the steel mill and to
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do these tasks must walk from one piece of equipment 
to another. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at 
37.
But the Court in Steiner thought it significant 
that there was no collective bargaining agreement 
that made clothes-changing time noncompensable. 
The Court remarked “the clear implication” of section 
203(o) “that clothes changing and washing, which are 
otherwise a part of the principal activity, may be 
expressly excluded from coverage by agreement.” 
Steiner v. Mitchell, supra, 350 U.S. at 255 (emphasis 
added). That is what happened in this case. Section 
203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement to reclassify changing time as nonworking 
time, and they did so, agreeing that the workday 
would not start when the workers changed their 
clothes; it would start when they arrived at their 
work site. If clothes-changing time is lawfully not 
compensated, we can’t see how it could be thought a 
principal employment activity, and so section 254(a) 
exempts the travel time in this case.
As with clothes-changing time, workers would 
not benefit in the long run from a rule that travel 
time must be compensated. It would mean that in an 
8-hour shift (the hourly workers at the Gary steel 
works work 8-hour shifts), the employer would not 
obtain eight hours of productive work; he would be 
paying the same wage and getting less work in return 
(or getting the same work but paying time and half 
overtime for the workers’ travel time), and so the 
wage would have to fall the next time the collective
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bargaining agreement was renegotiated unless the 
laws of economics were repealed. Employers would 
also be moved to limit the time they allowed their 
workers for travel (which would require more super­
visors and cause disputes) and perhaps to reduce 
travel time further by moving the locker rooms closer 
to the work stations. These measures would spell 
higher costs for the employer — higher labor costs. 
The higher such costs are, the lower the hourly wage 
will be. And so the higher costs would be borne ulti­
mately by the workers.
Employers could emasculate the plaintiffs’ inter­
pretation of the “primary activity” provision by plac­
ing the locker rooms in the work stations, for then 
there would be no post-primary-activity travel time. 
There is something amiss with an interpretation that 
implies that the location of the locker room, rather 
than the amount of time involved in walking to one’s 
work station, determines one’s statutory entitlement 
to compensation. Suppose it is 100 yards from the 
plant entrance to the locker room and another 100 
yards to the work station. On the plaintiffs’ view, 
traversing the second 100 yards is compensable, 
though traversing the first 100 yards is not, but if the 
locker room were adjacent to the work station none of 
the workers’ travel time would be compensable even 
though the amount of walking they’d be doing would 
be identical. What sense could that make?
It was concern with the disruption of the work­
place caused by forcing employers to compensate for
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travel time and clothes-changing time, as the Su­
preme Court held they must do in Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co., supra, 328 U.S. at 690-92; 
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United 
Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 163-64 (1945); and 
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local 
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944), that drove the 
enactment of sections 203(o) and 254(a). IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, supra, 546 U.S. at 25-26; Sepulveda v. Allen 
Family Foods, Inc., supra, 591 F.3d at 217; Anderson 
v. Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d at 957-58; Adams v. 
United States, 471 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Thomas v. Howard University Hospital, 39 
F.3d 370, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “The FLSA. . . does 
not define the terms ‘work’ or ‘workweek.’ The Su­
preme Court defined these terms ‘broadly’ in its early 
FLSA cases . .. defined them so broadly, in fact, that 
Congress found it necessary to amend the statute to 
restore some sanctity to private employment con­
tracts.” Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., supra, 
591 F.3d at 217.
This history provides guidance to the meaning of 
“clothes” and “principal activity” by showing that 
Congress was trying to eliminate the disruptions that 
the Court’s interpretation of the Fair Labor Stand­
ards Act had caused, and to allow the determination 
of what is compensable work in borderline cases (is 
changing into work clothes “work”? is walking from a 
locker room to a work station “work”?) to be settled by 
negotiation between labor and management. As the
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preamble to the Portal-to-Portal Act states, rather 
dramatically,
The Congress finds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 . . . has been inter­
preted judicially in disregard of long- 
established customs, practices, and contracts 
between employers and employees, thereby 
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, im­
mense in amount and retroactive in opera­
tion, upon employers with the results that, if 
said Act as so interpreted or claims arising 
under such interpretations were permitted to 
stand, (1) the payment of such liabilities 
would bring about financial ruin of many 
employers and seriously impair the capital 
resources of many others, thereby resulting 
in the reduction of industrial operations, 
halting of expansion and development, cur­
tailing employment, and the earning power 
of employees; (2) the credit of many employ­
ers would be seriously impaired; (3) there 
would be created both an extended and con­
tinuous uncertainty on the part of industry, 
both employer and employee, as to the finan­
cial condition of productive establishments 
and a gross inequality of competitive condi­
tions between employers and between indus­
tries; (4) employees would receive windfall 
payments, including liquidated damages, 
of sums for activities performed by them 
without any expectation of reward beyond 
that included in their agreed rates of pay;
(5) there would occur the promotion of in­
creasing demands for payment to employees
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for engaging in activities no compensation 
for which had been contemplated by either 
the employer or employee at the time they 
were engaged in; [and] (6) voluntary collec­
tive bargaining would be interfered with and 
industrial disputes between employees and 
employers and between employees and em­
ployees would be created. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 251(a).
Only one previous appellate case has decided 
whether noncompensable changing time can be work 
time for purposes of the travel-time exemption. In 
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618-19 (6th Cir. 
2010), as in this case, the employer, invoking section 
203(o), did not pay its workers for time spent chang­
ing into work clothes. The court concluded neverthe­
less that changing time, because required by the 
employer, was a “principal activity.” This seems 
clearly wrong, for the reasons we’ve explained (and 
the Franklin opinion offers only a conclusion, not 
reasons). But because by disagreeing with Franklin 
we would create an inter-circuit conflict, we have 
circulated this opinion to the full court in advance of 
publication. 7th Cir. R. 40(e). None of the judges in 
regular active service voted to hear the case en banc. 
(Judge Williams did not participate in the Rule 40(e) 
consideration of the matter.)
The Department of Labor has participated as an 
amicus curiae in this appeal on the side of the plain­
tiffs, and we end by considering what weight we
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should give its views. During the Clinton Administra­
tion the Department took a narrow view of the mean­
ing of the term “clothes” for purposes of determining 
whether time spent in changing in and out of work 
clothes could be excluded under section 203(o) from 
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions. 
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter, 2001 WL 
58864 (Jan. 15, 2001); Opinion Letter, 1997 WL 
998048 (Dec. 3, 1997). During the Bush Administra­
tion the Department took a broad view -  broader 
than we take -  of what “clothes” means in the FLSA, 
and added that clothes-changing time excluded under 
section 203(o) could not be a “principal activity” under 
the Portal-to-Portal Act. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion 
Letter, 2007 WL 2066454 (May 14, 2007); Opinion 
Letter, 2002 WL 33941766 (June 6, 2002). After the 
change in administrations in 2009 the Department 
reverted to the Clinton Administration’s position on 
“changing clothes” and also rejected the Bush Admin­
istration’s position on “principal activity.” U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, 
2010 WL 2468195 (June 16, 2010). Such oscillation is 
a normal phenomenon of American politics. Demo­
crats are friendlier to unions than Republicans are, 
though we cannot see how a decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs in this case would help unions. (No union is 
a party to this case or an amicus curiae.)
Naturally the Department of Labor does not 
acknowledge that its motive in switching sides was 
political; that would be a crass admission in a brief or 
in oral argument, and unlikely to carry weight with
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the judges. The Department says instead that it is 
right as a matter of law and that the position the 
Department took in the Bush years is wrong; it adds 
that since it enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act its 
(current) position should carry weight with us. But all 
the Department does to demonstrate the “rightness” 
of its current position is to echo the plaintiffs’ argu­
ments. Nowhere in the Department’s brief is there a 
reference to any institutional knowledge of labor 
markets possessed by the Department’s staff -  or to 
anything indeed to which the parties might not have 
complete access — that might help the court to decide 
the case sensibly; and at the oral argument the 
Department’s lawyer acknowledged this void. All that 
the Department has contributed to our deliberations, 
therefore, though it is not quite nothing, is letting us 
know that it disagrees with the position taken by the 
Bush Department of Labor; for if it were silent, from 
which one might infer that it agreed with that posi­
tion, it would be inviting U.S. Steel to argue that the 
Department of Labor had been consistent, at least 
since 2001, and thus across Administrations con­
trolled by opposite political parties, in rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ position.
It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001 
the plaintiffs would win because the President was a 
Democrat, between 2001 and 2009 the defendant 
would win because the President was a Republican, 
and in 2012 the plaintiffs would win because the 
President is again a Democrat. That would make a 
travesty of the principle of deference to interpretations
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of statutes by the agencies responsible for enforcing 
them, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 
n. 30 (1987), since that principle is based on a belief 
either that agencies have useful knowledge that can 
aid a court or that they are delegates of Congress 
charged with interpreting and applying their organic 
statutes consistently with legislative purpose. We are 
not surprised to discover that courts of appeals that 
have reached varied conclusions on the issues pre­
sented by this appeal have come together in spurning, 
as Judge Wilkinson has put it, “the gyrating agency 
letters on the subject.” Sepulveda v. Allen Family 
Foods, Inc., supra, 591 F.3d at 216 n. 3; see also 
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, supra, 644 F.3d at 1139; 
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., supra, 619 F.3d at 612-14; 
Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., supra, 339 F.3d at 905 n. 9; 
contra, Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., supra, 488 F.3d at 
956-57.
We resolve the specific issue that we have been 
asked to resolve in this interlocutory appeal in favor 
of U.S. Steel. On the basis of that resolution, the suit 
has no merit and should be dismissed by the district 
court.
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(Filed Jan. 5, 2010)
On October 15, 2009, the court granted in part 
and denied in part United States Steel Corporation’s 
summary judgment motion. The court granted U.S. 
Steel’s request for judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o), concluding that the plaintiffs’ activities of 
changing clothes and showering at the beginning and 
end of their shifts were excluded from measured 
working time by the express terms of, or by a custom 
or practice under, the applicable collective-bargaining 
agreement(s); denied U.S. Steel’s request for judg­
ment based on the de minimis doctrine and the 
grievance and arbitration procedures of the applic­
able CBA; and denied U.S. Steel’s request for judg­
ment under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) because the court 
couldn’t conclude “as a matter of law that the non­
compensability of donning, doffing, and showering 
activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) excludes consider­
ation of whether, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a),
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those activities are an integral and indispensable 
part of employees’ principal activities.” Upon further 
consideration of U.S. Steel’s arguments that donning, 
doffing, showering, and laundering personal clothing 
aren’t integral and indispensable activities, the court 
agreed with U.S. Steel that showering (excluding Coke 
plant employees) and laundering of personal clothing 
weren’t compensable activities under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 254(a), but found that U.S. Steel hadn’t established 
that the donning and doffing of protective clothing 
isn’t an integral and indispensable part of the em­
ployees’ principal activities.
U.S. Steel now asks that the court certify an 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The 
ruling sought to be appealed relates to the interaction 
of 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) and 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) and 
whether § 203(o) activities can be principal activities 
that begin and end a work day. U.S. Steel also asks 
the court to reconsider a portion of its October 15 
ruling. The court addresses the requests separately.
I. M o t io n  to  R e c o n s id e r
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides 
that a court may alter or amend an interlocutory 
order any time before entry of final judgment. See 
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (“[EJvery order short of a final 
decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the 
district judge.”). Unlike a motion to reconsider a final 
judgment, which must meet the requirements of Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, “a motion to
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reconsider an interlocutory order may be entertained 
and granted as justice requires.” Akzo Coatings, Inc. 
v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 
1995).
Reconsideration of an interlocutory order may be 
appropriate when the facts or law on which the 
decision was based change significantly after issu­
ance of the order, or when the court has misunder­
stood a party, made a decision outside the adversarial 
issues presented by the parties, or made an error not 
of reasoning but of apprehension. Bank of Waunakee 
v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 
(7th Cir. 1990). “These grounds represent extraordi­
nary circumstances, and the granting of a motion to 
reconsider is to be granted only in such extraordinary 
circumstances . . . Indeed, the court’s orders are not 
mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsidera­
tion at a litigant’s pleasure.” United States Securities 
and Exch. Comm’n v. National Presto Indus., Inc., No. 
02-C-5027, 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D. 111. Apr. 28, 
2004). Motions to reconsider serve a limited function: 
“to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present 
newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 
(7th Cir. 1996).
U.S. Steel seeks reconsideration of the court’s 
determination that the company waived its collective 
bargaining argument relating to the plaintiffs’ walk­
ing time claim because, U.S. Steel says, the company 
raised the argument in a timely and fair manner 
significantly before the filing of U.S. Steel’s reply
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brief and the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to 
respond to the argument. The court can’t agree.
A review of U.S. Steel’s summary judgment 
submissions shows that, contrary to U.S. Steel’s 
assertion, the company’s reliance on provisions of the 
CBA in support of its argument under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 254(a) first appeared in the reply brief. See Deft. S. 
Judg. Reply, at 16-17. U.S. Steel claims it “expressly 
raised -  and set forth in detail -  the argument re­
garding deference to the parties’ [CBA] with respect 
to walking time in its Motion for Leave to Supple­
ment its Statement of Material Facts and Appendix of 
Record Evidence in Support of its Motion for Sum­
mary Judgment.” While U.S. Steel’s claim is true -  
the “Motion for Leave to Supplement” contains that 
argument — the argument isn’t contained in either 
the “Supplement to Statement of Material Facts” or 
the “Supplement to Appendix” filed by U.S. Steel.
U.S. Steel’s “Motion for Leave to Supplement” 
(docket # 106) was filed on September 17, 2008 and 
granted on September 23 (docket # 108); the com­
pany’s “Supplement to Statement of Material Facts” 
and “Supplement to Appendix” became docket num­
bers 111 and 112, respectively, on September 29. The 
arguments U.S. Steel set forth in its “Motion for 
Leave to Supplement” were made in support of its 
request that it be allowed to supplement the sum­
mary judgment record. An opposing party might 
expect to respond to the “Motion for Leave to Sup­
plement” by agreeing or objecting to U.S. Steel’s 
request to file a supplement, but the “Supplement”
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and “Appendix” documents don’t contain any ar­
gument relating to consideration or application of 
provisions of the 2008 CBA to the company’s argu­
ment under the Portal-to-Portal Act, so neither the 
opposing party nor the court would have been alerted 
that the “Motion for Leave to Supplement” was 
intended to be part of the company’s summary judg­
ment submission. The arguments U.S. Steel now 
relies on weren’t made in support of the company’s 
request for summary judgment until the reply brief, 
depriving the plaintiffs of an opportunity to respond. 
The company’s motion to reconsider is denied.
II. M o t io n  to  C e r tify  I n t e r l o c u t o r y  A pp eal
U.S. Steel asks the court to certify the following 
question for appeal: “Under the FLSA, where it has 
been determined that the activities of donning, doff­
ing, and washing are not to be included in hours of 
employment by operation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), can 
such activities, under any circumstances, start or end 
the continuous work day under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) of 
the Portal-to-Portal Act?”
Interlocutory appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that
When a district judge, in making in a civil 
action an order not otherwise appealable un­
der this section, shall be of the opinion that 
such order involves a controlling question 
of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an
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immediate appeal from the order may mate­
rially advance the ultimate termination of 
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in 
such order.
Certification under § 1292(b) requires four statutory 
criteria be met: (1) there must be a question of law,
(2) it must be controlling', (3) it must be contestable', 
and (4) its resolution must promise to speed up the 
litigation. Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. 
of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
in original). “There is also a nonstatutory require­
ment: the petition must be filed in the district court 
within a reasonable time after the order sought to be 
appealed. Unless all these criteria are satisfied, the 
district court may not and should not certify its order 
to [the appellate court] for an immediate appeal 
under section 1292(b).” Id. “Certification is the excep­
tion and not the rule.” In re Brand Name Prescription 
Drugs Antitrust Litig., 878 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (N.D. 
111. 1995).
(1) Is There A  Question of Law?
The phrase “question of law” in § 1292(b) relates 
to a “question of the meaning of a statutory or consti­
tutional provision, regulation, or common law doc­
trine rather than to whether the party opposing 
summary judgment [has] raised a genuine issue of 
material fact.” Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees, 219 
F.3d at 676. The framers of § 1292(b) intended the 
term “question of law” to refer to a “ ‘pure’ question of 
law rather than merely to an issue that might be free
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from a factual contest. The idea was that if a case 
turned on a pure question of law, something the court 
of appeals could decide quickly and clearly without 
having to study the record, the court should be en­
abled to do so without having to wait till the end of 
the case.” Ahrenholz u. Board of Trustees, 219 F.3d at 
676-677; see also McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 
381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (section 1292(b) 
appeals “were intended, and should be reserved, for 
situations in which the court of appeals can rule on a 
pure, controlling question of law without having to 
delve beyond the surface of the record in order to 
determine the facts.”).
U.S. Steel presents a question of statutory inter­
pretation relating to the interaction of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(o) and 29 U.S.C. § 254(a): whether the activities 
of changing clothes and washing that are not included 
in “the hours for which an employee is employed” 
under Section 203(o) can, under any circumstance, 
start or end the continuous work day under Section 
254(a). A fact-specific decision isn’t necessary and the 
question can be decided without further study of the 
record, so the question presented qualifies as a “ques­
tion of law” for purposes of § 1292(b).
(2) Is the Question of Law Controlling?
“A ‘controlling question’ can exist where resolu­
tion of the question will resolve the litigation in its 
entirety or where it will establish whether a particu­
lar claim exists.” DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca,
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Inc., No. 08-C-488, 2009 WL 750278, at *2 (E.D. Wis. 
Mar. 20, 2009). In other words, resolution of a control­
ling question of law must affect the course of the 
litigation.
The plaintiffs and the defendant agree that this 
issue’s resolution would establish whether the case 
would proceed to trial. Were U.S. Steel to prevail on 
appeal, no trial would be necessary and the litigation 
would be resolved in its entirety. Thus, the question 
of law is controlling.
(3) Is the Question of Law Contestable1?
The third statutory criterion is whether the 
question of law is contestable, that is, whether “sub­
stantial grounds for a difference of opinion” on the 
issue exist. City of Joliet v. Mid-City Nat’l Bank, No. 
05-C-6746, 2008 WL 4889038, at *2 (N.D. 111. June 13,
2008). “[A] court faced with a motion for certification 
must analyze the strength of the arguments in oppo­
sition to the challenged ruling to decide whether the 
issue is truly one on which there is a substantial 
ground for dispute.” Williams u. Saxon Mortgage Co., 
No. 06-0799-WS-B, 2007 WL 4105126, at *2 (S.D. Ala. 
Nov. 15, 2007) (quoting APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T 
Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2003))); see 
also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909-910 (S.D. Ind. 
2002) (certification is appropriate where “other courts 
have adopted conflicting positions regarding the issue 
of law proposed for certification”).
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This court considered U.S. Steel’s summary 
judgment arguments on this issue and found that it 
couldn’t conclude “as a matter of law that the non­
compensability of donning, doffing, and showering 
activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) excludes consider­
ation of whether, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a), 
those activities are an integral and indispensable 
part of employees’ principal activities at USS.” Op. 
and Ord., at 28. Some courts have reached a similar 
conclusion. See Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (court was 
“not convinced that § 203(o) changes the ‘principal’ 
nature of donning and doffing activities, or that 
‘principal’ activities somehow become ‘preliminary’ or 
‘postliminary’ under the Portal Act simply because 
they are rendered noncompensable by a collective- 
bargaining agreement in accordance with § 203(o)” ); 
Gatewood v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 569 
F. Supp. 2d 687, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Although the 
act of ‘changing clothes’ itself is barred based on 
§ 203(o) . . . , the activities that occur after changing 
into sanitary gear and before changing out of sanitary 
gear are not impacted by the defense. If the jury 
determined that donning and doffing this gear was 
integral and indispensable, their commencement 
would trigger the ‘continuous workday rule,’ and 
might make the walking and waiting time at issue 
compensable.”); Johnson v. Koch Foods, Inc., No. 2:07- 
CV-51, 2009 WL 3817447, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13,
2009) (“if the donning, doffing, and washing excluded 
by § 203(o) are determined by the trier of fact to be 
integral and indispensable, those activities could
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commence the workday”); and Figas v. Horsehead 
Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *20 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 3, 2008) (“[T]he Court is convinced that 
activities rendered noncompensable under § 203(o) by 
a collective-bargaining agreement can nevertheless 
mark the beginning and the end of a continuous 
workday for purposes of the Portal Act, and that 
§ 203(o) should be read to exclude only ‘time spent in 
changing clothes or washing.’ ”). Other courts, as well 
as the Department of Labor, have concluded to the 
contrary, holding that activities covered by Section 
203(o) -  activities excluded' from “hours worked” -  
can’t be considered principal activities and don’t start 
the workday. See Hudson v. Butterball, LLC, No. 08- 
5071-CV-SW-RED, 2009 WL 3486780, at *4 (W.D. Mo. 
Oct. 14, 2009) (“Because time Hudson spent sanitiz­
ing, donning, and doffing is excluded from hours 
worked under § 203(o), the walking time did not 
follow or precede a principal work activity, and there­
fore is not compensable.”); Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1011 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (“once an 
activity has been deemed a section 3(o) activity, it 
cannot be considered a principal activity”); Depart­
ment of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA 2007-10, 2007 
WL 2066454, at *1 (May 14, 2007) (“[Activities 
covered by section 3(o) cannot be considered principal 
activities and do not start the workday.”).
In deciding the issue of the interaction between 
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(o) and 254(a), the court carefully 
considered, contrasted, and compared the cases just 
cited and the many reasons cited for those decisions.
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Grounds exist for a difference of opinion on the issue 
and the arguments in opposition to the challenged 
ruling aren’t insubstantial. Accord Andrako v. United 
States Steel Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412 (W.D. 
Pa. 2009) (“This question -  whether Section 203(o) 
renders otherwise principal activities simply non­
compensable or both non-compensable and non­
principal — is a difficult one and one that has divided 
the few authorities that have addressed it.”). The 
question of law presented here is not settled by 
controlling authority and, as evidenced by the differ­
ing conclusions cited above, is contestable.
(4) Will Resolution of the Question of Law 
Speed Up the Litigation1?
“This is not a difficult requirement to under­
stand. It means that resolution of a controlling legal 
question would serve to avoid a trial or otherwise 
substantially shorten the litigation.” McFarlin v. 
Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2004).
The class certification issue still pends. According 
to U.S. Steel, without interlocutory appeal, the par­
ties will be required to brief the certification issue, 
and if the class is certified, provide notice to potential 
class members, undertake additional discovery, and 
likely file further dispositive motions. Ultimately, a 
trial on the merits might be required. “In stark con­
trast, if the court of appeals were to reverse on the 
question of law on which U.S. Steel seeks certification,
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the case would be over. Thus, there potentially is 
substantial saving of time of the district court and of 
expense to the litigants.” Deft. Memo., at 12 n. 5.
“Interlocutory appeal is favored where reversal 
would substantially alter the course of the district 
court proceedings or relieve the parties of significant 
burdens. . . . Immediate resolution of this issue has 
the potential to materially advance this litigation 
because it will potentially save judicial resources and 
litigant expense.” West Tennessee Chapter of Associ­
ated Builders and Contractors, Inc. u. City of Mem­
phis, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1026 (W.D. Tenn. 2000). 
The fourth requirement is met.
(5) Is the Motion Timely1?
While the statute doesn’t contain a time limita­
tion, U.S. Steel’s filing of its motion eleven days after 
the issuance of the order sought to be appealed meets 
the non-statutory requirement that the request be 
filed within a “reasonable time.”
III. C o n c l u s io n
The court grants in part and denies in part the 
defendants’ motion [docket # 159]: the request for 
reconsideration is DENIED and the request for 
certification of interlocutory appeal is GRANTED.
The question the court believes meets the crite­
ria for interlocutory review is the following: “Under 
the FLSA, where it has been determined that the
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activities of donning, doffing, and washing are not to 
be included in hours of employment by operation of 
29 U.S.C. § 203(o), can such activities, under any 
circumstances, start or end the continuous work day 
under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)?”
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: January 5. 2010
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr._____
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
HAMMOND DIVISION
CLIFTON SANDIFER, et al., )
Plaintiffs ^
. vs. ) CAUSE NO.
UNITED STATES ) 2:07-CV-443 RM
STEEL CORP., )
Defendant \
OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiffs, current or past employees at United 
States Steel’s Gary Works, allege that they work or 
have worked numerous pre-shift, post-shift, and other 
hours in excess of forty hours per week for which they 
haven’t been paid overtime compensation, that USS 
doesn’t provide them with an itemized statement of 
the total hours worked each pay period, and that USS 
doesn’t maintain proper records of hours worked by 
employees, all in violation of the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The plaintiffs allege 
in their complaint [filed December 21, 2007, docket 
# 1] that they are entitled to overtime compensation 
for a variety of activities performed on and off the 
job site. They bring their claims individually and as 
part of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
on behalf of other similarly situated individually
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currently or formerly employed by USS.1 The plain­
tiffs seek liquidated damages (or, alternatively, inter­
est), overtime compensation, attorneys fees, and 
costs.
The case is before the court on USS’s summary 
judgment motion, in which the company argues that 
various provisions of the parties’ labor agreements 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act bar the plaintiffs’ 
claims. A hearing was held on the summary judgment 
motion on June 1, 2009. Based on the parties’ oral 
arguments and written submissions, the court grants 
in part and denies in part the defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Some 5,000 people are employed at USS’s Gary 
Works plant where steel is produced and finished. 
Five hundred employees work in management or 
as nonunion clerical workers. The rest are union- 
workers represented by the United Steelworkers of 
America: production and maintenance workers in the 
Coke and Chemical Division, Iron Producing Division, 
Steel Producing North Division, Steel Producing 
South Division, and Operations Services Division are 
members of Local 1014; production and maintenance 
workers in the finishing operations (Hot Rolling
1 Magistrate Judge Cherry stayed briefing on the plaintiffs’ 
motion to certify class [docket # 32] on March 28, 2008 [docket 
# 34] pending the court’s ruling on the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion.
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Division, Sheet Products Division, and Tin Products 
Division) are members of Local 1066. The plaintiffs 
are current or former employees of USS and current 
or former members of the Steelworkers Union.
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements
The USS/USWA collective bargaining agreements 
(CBA) applicable to the issues before the court are the 
2003 CBA, effective from May 20, 2003 to September
1, 2008, and the 2008 CBA, a four-year contract that 
became effective on September 9, 2008. Those CBAs 
contain the terms and conditions for the production 
and maintenance workers at all of USS’s domestic 
steel producing facilities, including the Gary Works.
B. Daily Activities of Employees
Gary Works plant employees enter the facility 
through any of seven entrances located at various 
places across the length of the plant. Employees park 
their cars in company parking lots, walk to a gate 
entrance, enter the premises via a personal swipe 
card, and proceed to their assigned work location or 
to one of several locker rooms and then to their 
assigned work location.
USS employees have access to personal lockers 
and locker room facilities at the plant where they can 
store their belongings and change into and out of 
their work clothes. Coke Plant workers use lockers 
that are partitioned so employees’ work and street
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clothes can be stored separately. OSHA regulations 
require that items worn in the Coke Plant not be 
removed from the locker room area except in a closed 
container, so USS contracts for the removal and 
laundering of those garments. The locker rooms also 
include shower facilities. Employees holding positions 
in the Coke Plant are required to shower at the end of 
their shift and, under the CBAs, are afforded time to 
do so2; employees who aren’t required to shower at 
the end of their shift may do so if they choose.
USS provides protective clothing and equipment 
(PPE) for all employees. Such items include flame- 
retardant jackets and pants (“greens”), safety glasses, 
a hard hat, protective footwear (steel-toed shoes 
with metatarsal guards), gloves, hearing protection, 
snoods, spats, leggings, and/or wristlets. Protective 
gloves and hearing devices generally aren’t donned 
before the start of the shift, but are put on once the 
employee arrives at the work site. The specific items 
of PPE worn by an individual employee depends on 
the requirements of an employee’s job assignment. 
Other specialized items, such as respirators, alumi- 
nized suits, chemical suits, and welders hoods, are
2 USS says the 2003 CBA and local agreements and prac­
tices at the Gary Works Plant permitted Coke Plant employees 
to leave their work stations fifteen to twenty minutes before the 
end of their shifts for wash-up time, provided that the require­
ments of the pushing schedule and other production needs had 
been met. Kolb Dec., 1^ 52 [Deft. App. 21]. The 2008 CBA Letter 
Agreement provides Coke Plant employees with twenty minutes 
of wash-up time prior to the end of their shift. Deft. App. 392.
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kept and put on as needed at job locations. All of the 
PPE items just mentioned are purchased, main­
tained, and laundered by USS (or its vendors), are 
available for employees’ use only at the plant, and 
may not be removed from the plant.
The parties agree that workers must arrive at 
the plant before the start of their shift so they can put 
on their PPE and arrive at their work stations by the 
time the shift officially begins. Paid shifts begin when 
the person arrives at the assigned work station to 
begin work, and paid shifts end “eight hours later or, 
if overtime is worked, when the employee actually 
stops working.” [Deft. Stmt, of Material Facts,  ^24.] 
Time employees spend in pre- and post-shift donning, 
doffing, walking, showering (with the exception of 
Coke plant employees), and laundering personal 
clothing -  time the plaintiffs say averages nine to ten 
hours per week — is unpaid. At issue is whether Gary 
Works employees should be compensated for those 
pre- and post-shift hours.3
3 The plaintiffs appear to claim in their Supplemental 
Citation [docket # 150] addressing the decision in Andrako v. 
United States Steel, 632 F. Supp. 2d 398 (W.D. Pa. 2009), that 
they have advanced a claim that they were required to attend 
pre- and post-shift safety briefings without compensation, but 
neither the complaint nor the summary judgment record con­
tains any such claim. The plaintiffs state in their summary 
judgment response that “[s]upervisors require employees to be 
at safety meetings, or at their work station, ready to begin work 
at the time their shift begins with all of their PPE donned and 
secured.” Stmt, of Genuine Issues of Fact, at 4; Resp., at 8. The 
(Continued on following page)
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. C iv . P. 56(c). 
The court must construe the evidence and all infer­
ences that reasonably can be drawn from the evi­
dence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, here, the plaintiffs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Summary judgment 
for a defendant is appropriate when a plaintiff ‘fails 
to make a sufficient showing to establish the exis­
tence of an element essential to [his or her] case on 
which [he or she] will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.’ ” Johnson v. ExxonMobil Corp., 426 F.3d 887, 
892. (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. 
Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-806 (1999)). Summary 
judgment is not appropriate when “the evidence pre­
sents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
plaintiffs can’t use their Supplemental Citation to amend their 
complaint or supplement the summary judgment record, cf. 
Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 758 n.15 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’s claim “could be disregarded because Ms. 
Burks did not plead such a claim, nor did she amend her com­
plaint to include it”); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 
781 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint 
through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment.”), so the issue of attending pre- and post­
shift safety meetings without compensation isn’t properly before 
the court and won’t be addressed.
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to a jury.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S. at 251- 
252. The proper inquiry, then, is “whether there is the 
need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be 
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may 
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 
250. Summary judgment “is the put up or shut up 
moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what 
evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact 
to accept its version of the events.” Springer u. 
Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Enacted in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., guarantees “compensation for 
all work or employment engaged in by employees 
covered by the Act.” Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602 (1944). The 
FLSA requires employers to pay their employees “a 
wage for all of the ‘work’ that they do,” Spoerle v. 
Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 
(W.D. Wis. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207), and to 
pay them one and a half times their hourly wage for 
every hour that they work in excess of forty hours a 
week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA doesn’t define 
“work,” but that term has been broadly construed to 
include “physical or mental exertion (whether burden­
some or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit 
of the employer and his business.” Tennessee Coal v.
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Muscoda, 321 U.S. at 598; see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 790.6(a) & (b) (a “workday” is “roughly described as 
the period ‘from whistle to whistle,’ ” which includes 
all time within “the period between the commence­
ment and completion” of an employee’s principal 
activities, regardless of whether employee engages in 
work throughout the entire period).
Certain provisions of the FLSA were amended in 
1947 by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251- 
262, which exempts employers from compensating 
employees for (1) time spent walking, riding, or trav­
eling to and from the actual place of performance of 
the principal activity the employee is employed to 
perform, and (2) engaging in preliminary or post- 
liminary activities if those actions occur either prior 
to the time the employee starts engaging in “principal 
activities” or after the employee stops engaging in 
“principal activities” on any particular workday. 29 
U.S.C. § 254(a). A “principal activity” is “an integral 
and indispensable part of the principal activities for 
which covered workmen are employed.” Steiner v. 
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 270.8(a) (“[I]n order for an activity to be a ‘principal’ 
activity, it need not be predominant in some way over 
all other activities engaged in by the employee in 
performing his job; rather, an employee may, for 
purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act, be engaged in 
several ‘principal’ activities during the workday. The 
‘principal’ activities referred to in the statute are 
activities which the employee is ‘employed to per­
form.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
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The FLSA was amended again in 1949 by the 
addition of Section 3(o), which provides that in de­
termining the hours for which an employee is em­
ployed, “there shall be excluded any time spent in 
changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end 
of each workday which was excluded from measured 
working time during the week involved by the ex­
press terms of or by custom or practice under a bona 
fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to a 
particular employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
USS maintains its employment practices don’t 
violate the FLSA, and the company has moved for 
summary judgment on the claims of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint. USS says the plaintiffs aren’t entitled to 
the relief they seek because (I) the additional com­
pensation sought is barred by language of the CBAs; 
(ii) overtime compensation for donning, doffing, and 
washing is barred by 29 U.S.C. § 203(o); (iii) the 
activities at issue are activities not compensable 
under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a); (iv) time spent donning, 
doffing, and washing is de minimis and therefore not 
compensable; and (v) plaintiffs didn’t seek relief 
through the mandatory grievance and arbitration 
procedures of the CBA.
The plaintiffs dispute USS’s summary judgment 
arguments. The plaintiffs contend the issue of com­
pensation for pre- and post-shift activities isn’t ad­
dressed by the express terms of the applicable CBA 
and genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether 
they are entitled to over-time compensation for 
reporting to work before their paid shift begins,
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donning and doffing protective clothing and safety 
equipment in the company locker rooms before and 
after their paid shifts begin and end, traveling to 
their assigned work stations within the plant before 
their paid shifts begin, traveling from their assigned 
work stations to the company locker rooms after their 
paid shifts end, showering at the work site after their 
paid shifts end, and transporting and laundering 
contaminated clothing away from the work place 
while off duty.4 The plaintiffs maintain they are 
entitled to be paid for time spent on those activities 
and USS has engaged in illegal pay practices by not 
compensating them for the many hours of pre- and 
post-shift work they perform on a daily and weekly 
basis.
A. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
USS says the plaintiffs are not entitled to the 
relief they seek based on 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) and the 
language of the applicable CBAs. Under Section 
203(o), time spent by employees in pre- and post-shift 
donning and doffing of PPE and showering is ex­
cluded from the computation of hours worked if two 
conditions are met: first, the activities at issue
4 In May 2008, the plaintiffs sought to bring an additional 
claim for overtime compensation relating to “buddy relief,” but 
they didn’t file an amended complaint containing that claim as 
directed by Magistrate Judge Cherry in his June 19, 2008 Order 
[docket # 91]. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ “buddy relief” claim is 
not properly before the court.
44a
constitute “changing clothes” as that term is used in 
the statute, and, second, a bona fide collective bar­
gaining agreement excludes, by its express terms or 
by a custom or practice under the agreement, time 
spent changing clothes and washing from compensa­
ble working time. Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 
1063, 1065 (D. Minn. 2007). The burden is on USS to 
establish that the time spent on those activities 
should be excluded from plaintiffs’ compensation. Davis 
v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 
1314, 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2004); cf. Roe-Midgett v. CC 
Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The 
burden is on CCS to establish that an employee 
falls within the FLSA’s administrative exemption.”); 
Kennedy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 F.3d 365, 
370 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the employer’s burden to 
establish that an employee is exempt from the FLSA’s 
overtime requirements.”). USS maintains it can 
establish both elements.
1. Changing Clothes
(a) “Clothes”
USS contends the PPE worn by employees at the 
Gary Works plant constitutes “clothes” as that term is 
used in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). USS relies on W eb ste r ’s 
T hird  N e w  In t e r n a t io n a l  D ictio n ar y  428 (1986), 
which defines “clothes” as “clothing,” which, in turn, 
is defined as “covering for the human body or gar­
ments in general: all the garments and accessories 
worn by a person at any one time.” USS maintains
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“[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction is 
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be inter­
preted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, com­
mon meaning.” Alabama Tissue Ctr. of the Univ. of 
Alabama Health Serv. Found,., P.C. v. Sullivan, 975 
F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992). USS says giving the 
word “clothes” its ordinary meaning finds support in 
decisions like Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 
955-956 (11th Cir. 2007); Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066-1067 (D. Minn. 2007); and 
Davis v. Charben Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302 
F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321-1322 (M.D. Ala. 2004), and in 
the Department of Labor’s construction of § 203(o) 
in the agency’s June 6, 2002 Opinion Letter.5 USS 
insists that even though courts don’t all agree on the 
proper definition for the term “clothes” in this con­
text, “the language of Section 203(o) [is] clear and 
unambiguous [and] a rational examination of the 
items at issue here reveals them to be what they are: 
‘clothes.’ ” Deft. Memo., at 12.
The plaintiffs urge the court to find that use of 
the phrase “changing clothes” in Section 203(o) “is 
most sensibly construed to refer to the act of exchang­
ing one set of ordinary clothing for another, such as a
6 In Opinion Letter FLSA 2002-2, the Wage and Hour Di­
vision of the DOL interpreted “clothes” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) 
to include “items worn on the body for covering, protection, or 
sanitation, but not to include tools or other implements such as 
knives, scabbards, or meat hooks.” 2002 WL 33941766, p. 3 
(June 6, 2002).
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uniform or work clothes,” and thus doesn’t include 
their donning and doffing of PPE. Resp., at 29. The 
plaintiffs maintain the items of PPE worn by Gary 
Works employees aren’t “clothes” as that phrase was 
defined in 1957 when Section 203(o) was enacted, 
citing to W e b st e r ’s  S eco n d  N e w  In te r n a t io n a l  D ic ­
tio n ar y  507 (1957), which defined “clothes” as “[c]ov- 
ering for the human body; vestments; venture; a 
general term for whatever covering is worn, or is 
made to be worn, for decency or comfort.” According 
to the plaintiffs, “ [w]hile protective equipment may 
cover the human body in a generic sense, such equip­
ment is not worn ‘for decency or comfort,’ but rather 
as a component of the gear and equipment the worker 
must use to safely perform the tasks required of him 
by his employer.” Resp., at 27-28.
The plaintiffs rely on the decision in Alvarez v. 
IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2003), which 
viewed § 203(o) as an “exemption” to the FLSA that 
was to be construed narrowly against the employer. 
The Alvarez court viewed the specialized gear worn 
by employees of a meat slaughtering and processing 
plant -  sanitary outer garments; hard hat; hair net; 
ear plugs; face shield or safety goggles; gloves; 
liquid-repelling sleeves; aprons; leggings; safety boots/ 
shoes; weight-lifting type belts; chain-link (mesh) 
metal aprons, leggings, vests, sleeves, and gloves; 
plexiglass arm guards; Kevlar gloves; and puncture- 
resistant protective sleeves -  as “different in kind 
from typical clothing” and held that “changing clothes 
means something different from donning required
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specialized personal protective equipment” 339 F.3d 
at 905. The plaintiffs say their PPE isn’t worn for 
“decency or comfort” or as substitute clothing.
Recognizing the continuing disagreement about 
the proper interpretation of “changing clothes” under 
§ 203(o),6 the court finds persuasive the reasoning of
6 Compare Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 632 
F. Supp. 2d 398, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (concluding that flame 
retardant jackets and pants, glasses, boots, snoods, and hard 
hats “unquestionably fall within . . . any common definition of 
the word ‘clothes’ ”); Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 302 
F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (finding hairnet, ear­
plugs, boots, a smock, an apron, cotton gloves, rubber gloves, 
cutting gloves, arm guards, and plastic sleeves qualified as 
clothes under § 203(o) in reliance on dictionary definition of 
“clothing” as “covering for the human body or garments in gen­
eral”); Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, 
at *11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that “all 
protective gear is outside the category of ‘clothes’ referenced in 
§ 203(o)” as “inconsistent with the plain language of the statu­
tory provision and the legislative intent reflected therein”); and 
Anderson v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Tex. 
2001) (donning and doffing aprons, smocks, gloves, boots, hair­
net, and earplugs not compensable), with Spoerle v. Kraft Foods 
Global Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (concluding 
that “clothes” refers only to “something the employee would 
normally wear anyway” or a replacement for such clothing and 
not “safety and sanitation equipment” that’s “uniquely job- 
related” and “under the employer’s control”); Gonzalez v. Farm­
ington Foods, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. 111. 2003) (donning 
and doffing of “sanitary and safety equipment,” including a 
helmet, white smock, plastic apron, arm guard, belly guard, 
plastic arm sleeve, a variety of gloves, a hook, knife holder, a 
piece of steel to straighten the edge of a knife blade, and knives 
didn’t constitute “changing clothes” under § 203(o)); and Perez v. 
Mountaire Farms, Inc., No. AMD 06-121, 2008 WL 2389798 (D.
(Continued on following page)
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Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 955-959 (11th 
Cir. 2007), and Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 407-410 (W.D. Pa. 2009), that 
the term “clothes” as used -  but not defined — in 
§ 203(o) should be given its ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning, that is, as “covering for the human 
body or garments in general,” as defined in Webster’s 
Third N e w  International Dictionary 428 (1986)). 
Anderson v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d at 955; Andrako v. USS, 
632 F. Supp. 2d at 409. Thus, a determination of 
whether an item of protective gear should be consid­
ered “clothes” under § 203(o) depends on the exact 
nature of the item and. the circumstances under 
which it is used. “A cloth jumpsuit, for instance, is 
probably clothing even if worn by a car mechanic as 
protection from oil and grease; a space suit is prob­
ably not clothing, even though it is a kind of protec­
tive outfit.” Kassa v. Kerry, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 
1067 (D. Minn. 2007). Regardless of whether an item 
is labeled “ ‘personal protective equipment’ or some­
thing else, a hair net is still a hair net, pants are still 
pants, and a smock is still a smock. Whether the 
items that plaintiffs don and doff are ‘clothes’ under 
§ 203(o) depends on what those items are, not on 
what they are called by the CBA, by [the] plant 
manager, or by anyone else.” Kassa v. Kerry, 487
Md. June 10, 2008) (narrowly construing “clothes” as not in­
cluding aprons, rain suits, cooler suits, gloves (rubber, chain, 
and wizard), arm guards or sleeves, goggles or safety glasses, 
boots, hair nets, beard nets, and bump caps).
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F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (emphasis in original); see also 
Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 269 F.3d 477, 480 n.3 (5th Cir. 
2001) (“nonsensical” to define “clothes” so narrowly as 
to exclude protective garments (lab coat, hair cover, 
facial hair cover, shoe cover) worn at plant).
USS has submitted for the court’s review the 
items of PPE the company provides for its employees. 
See Kolb Decl., Exh. 4. Unlike the speciality [sic] items 
at issue in Alvarez v. IBP, 339 F.3d at 898 n.2, or 
those in Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. CV-99-BE-1612,
2002 WL 32987224, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2002) 
(which included plastic aprons, thin knit gloves, cotton 
liner gloves, rubber outer gloves, mesh or chain 
gloves, dust masks, plastic sleeve covers, and hard 
plastic arm guards), the cloth jacket and pants, fabric 
snoods, hoods, leggings, and wristlets, and boots here 
at issue easily fall within the ordinary definition of 
“clothes.” See Andrako v. USS, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 410 
(finding same items of USS protective gear to be 
“clothing”: “by description, look, feel, purpose, fit, and 
basic common sense, the items at issue are ‘clothes’ 
within any reasonable meaning of Section 203(o)”); 
Figas v. Horsehead Corp., No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 
4170043, at *11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (the term “clothes” 
held to include flame-retardant jacket, pants, and/or 
coveralls, hard hat, and work shoes: “the adjective 
‘protective’ does not deprive ‘clothes’ of their funda­
mental character”). And even if the court were to 
assume that hard hats, safety glasses, and ear plugs 
aren’t “clothes,” but see Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 
1123, 1126 n.l (10th Cir. 1994) (requiring employees
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to put on safety glasses, earplugs, and a hard hat “is 
no different from having a baseball player show up in 
uniform, a businessperson with a suit and tie, or a 
judge with a robe”), the time expended by each em­
ployee donning and doffing those items is minimal, or 
de minimis, and thus not compensable under the 
FLSA. See Kassa v. Kerry, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 n.l 
(“Hair nets and beard nets are . . . purely functional 
and are not generally considered ‘clothes’ as that term 
is ordinarily used. But the precise classification of 
hair nets and beard nets is not important [because] 
donning and doffing those items alone is surely a de 
minimis activity.”).
(b) “Changing”
The plaintiffs further rely on W eb ste r ’s S eco n d  
N e w  In t e r n a t io n a l  D ictio n ary  448 (1957) for a 
definition of “changing” -  “to alter by substituting 
something else for, or by giving up for something else 
. . .  as, to change one’s clothes, one’s occupation, or 
one’s intention; to change cars or trains, partners, 
sides, or parties” — and conclude that Gary Works 
employees don’t “ ‘change clothes’ . . . when they 
insert ear plugs, or put on hard hats, safety glasses, 
steel-toed boots, snoods, hoods, leggings, wristlets, or 
a pair of work gloves, or don flame retardant protec­
tive jackets and pants over their street clothes be­
cause such acts do not involv[e] the substituting of 
clothing.” Resp., at 28-29. The court can’t agree. 
“Nothing in the statute’s language suggests that its 
application turns on whether one must fully disrobe
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or exchange one shirt, for example, for another,” 
Anderson v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d at 956, and the term 
“changing” can’t be read so narrowly as to exclude the 
actions of the plaintiffs in donning and doffing the 
PPE they wear each day. See W ebster ’s II N e w  
R iverside  U n ive r sity  D ictio n ar y  248 (1984) (defin­
ing “change” as: “To make different: alter; to give a 
totally different form or appearance to: transform). 
Even if each employee did nothing more than put the 
items of PPE over the clothing he or she wore to the 
plant, adding those items would satisfy the “change” 
requirement. See W ebster ’s T hird N ew  International  
D ictio n ary  373 (2002) (defining “change” as: “To 
make different: to make different in some particular 
but short of conversion into something else”).
While the plaintiffs argue for a narrow construc­
tion of § 203(o), say the court should follow Alvarez v. 
IBP, 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), and reject Anderson 
v. Cagle’s, 488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007), and claim 
the proper definition of “clothes” doesn’t include 
protective clothing of any kind, they haven’t applied 
their arguments to the specifics of this case. They 
haven’t explained why the items of protective cloth­
ing they are required to wear aren’t “clothes” or why 
their donning and doffing activities don’t amount to 
“changing clothes,” nor have they compared or 
contrasted their items of protective clothing with 
items at issue in other cases. The plaintiffs’ legal 
conclusion that protective clothing doesn’t qualify as 
clothing under § 203(o) doesn’t provide “the specific 
substantiating facts require[d] under Rule 56 to
52a
create a genuine issue of material fact.” Carter v. 
American Oil Co., 139 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 1998). 
The court concludes USS has satisfied the first ele­
ment under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
2. Collective Bargaining Agreement/Custom 
or Practice
To prevail on its § 203(o) defense, USS must 
establish not only that the items at issue in this case 
are “clothes” -  which it has done -  but also that the 
applicable CBA contains express terms excluding 
compensation for changing clothes and washing or 
there is a “custom or practice” under the applicable 
CBA of not paying workers for those pre- and post­
shift activities. The parties agree that Gary Works 
employees aren’t now and have never been compen­
sated for time spent donning and doffing protective 
gear and showering before their paid shifts begin or 
after the shifts end.7
USS maintains the terms of the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreements have excluded compensation 
for changing clothes and showering since 1947 when 
the issue was first memorialized in the parties’ Sup­
plemental Agreement, which provides that employees
7 All references to non-payment for “washing” or “shower­
ing” time recognizes the exception for Coke Plant employees 
who, pursuant to CBA provisions and local agreements and 
practices, are afforded wash-up time before the end of their paid 
shifts.
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won’t be paid for “time spent in preparatory or closing 
activities on the employer’s premises . . . for which 
compensation is not paid under present practices.” 
Deft. App. 267-268. USS says the referenced “prepar­
atory or closing activities” include the donning and 
doffing of work clothes and washing up, and the 
parties’ re-adoption of the terms of the 1947 Supple­
mental Agreement in subsequent CBAs establishes 
that the parties intended a custom or practice of non­
compensation to continue over the periods of those 
contracts, as well.
USS insists the 1947 Supplemental Agreement, 
which contains specific terms excluding compensation 
for these activities, has governed this issue since 
1947. For example, USS says, the 1947 Supplemental 
Agreement was re-adopted in the 1999 CBA, which, 
in Appendix C, specifically affirmed that “under­
standings reflected in the prior Supplemental Agree­
ment concerning so-called portal-to-portal claims are 
re-adopted” for the term of the agreement. Deft. App. 
269-270. USS says the 1947 Supplemental Agreement 
was incorporated into the 2003 CBA because that 
CBA specifically required new or different practices 
or agreements to be in writing and no writing relat­
ing to these activities was signed during that time. 
Kolb Decl., H 37. And, USS says, in 2008, the com­
pany and the Union agreed “that starting in 1947, 
every national collective bargaining agreement . . . 
negotiated by the parties has included an agreement 
that [USS] is not obligated to pay employees for 
preparatory or closing activities which occur outside
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of their scheduled shift or away from their worksite 
(i.e., so-called ‘portal-to-portal activities’) [including] 
donning and doffing of protective clothing (including 
such items as flame-retardant jacket and pants, 
metatarsal boots, hard hats, safety glasses, ear plugs, 
and a snood or hood) and washing up.” Deft. App. 392.
USS also says the issue of non-compensation for 
the activities at issue has arisen in local bargaining 
and grievances over the years, as evidenced by a 1983 
grievance filed by Local 1014 at USS’s Gary Works 
plant based on the following claim: “At the present 
time we pick our time cards up at the gate, get on a 
bus, go to washhouse, change clothes and then go to 
line up area. We don’t get paid until we get lined up.” 
The grievance requested that USS “[p]ay portal to 
portal from gates.” Deft. App. 271. USS says the 
union’s request was denied. Kolb Decl., *11 38. USS 
says the issue of washing or showering time has been 
addressed by the parties over the years, as well, as 
evidenced by grievances filed by the union in 1974, 
1977, 1980, 1983, and 1993 on behalf of employees in 
various departments of the Gary Works plant re­
questing that they be paid for time spent washingup/ 
showering at the end of their shifts. See Deft. App. 
290-311. USS concludes that changing clothes and 
showering “are not now, and have never been, consid­
ered compensable time at any point at Gary Works.” 
Kolb Decl., f  37.8
8 Mr. Kolb notes that local practices in the Coke Plant 
providing employees with wash-up time were allowed to 
(Continued on following page)
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Plaintiffs respond that the terms of the 1947 
Supplemental Agreement aren’t found in the 2003 
CBA and can’t be inferred as being applicable to the 
2003 contract because, according to plaintiff Clifton 
Sandifer, the 2003 CBA “declared that its express 
terms constituted the ‘full and complete understand­
ing’ between the parties. Sandifer Decl.,  ^26. Mr. 
Sandifer’s statement contains no reference or citation 
to the portion of the CBA upon which he relies. See 
Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“We will not scour a record to locate evi­
dence supporting a party’s legal argument.”).
Plaintiffs next claim that USS “essentially con­
cedes” that no agreement regarding these issues 
existed from 2003 to 2008 because the 2003 CBA 
didn’t incorporate the 1947 Supplemental Agreement. 
Resp., at 32. According to the plaintiffs, USS admit­
ted that the 2003 CBA “specifically intended to ter­
minate existing local agreements and practices and 
require that such agreements and practices be memo­
rialized in writing in the future.” Resp., at 31. The 
plaintiffs’ claim in this regard finds no support in the 
cited section of USS’s argument, see Deft. Memo., at 
189, or in plain language of the applicable sections of
continue under the 2003 CBA if the time provided didn’t dimin­
ish productivity or interfere with the demands of the production 
schedule. Kolb Decl., *11 52.
9 USS presented the following argument on this point: “In 
2003, the [Union] and [USS] entered into the current [CBA], 
which, while not expressly referring to the 1947 Supplemental 
Agreement, made it clear that the decades-old custom and 
(Continued on following page)
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the 2003 CBA. Section 5.A.6 of the 2003 CBA requires 
that “all future Local Working Conditions” — that is, 
those arising from 2003 forward -  “be reduced to 
writing.” Deft. App. 89. USS says the custom or 
practice here at issue has existed since 1947, so in 
2003 the custom or practice wasn’t a “future” local 
working condition that was required to be in writing. 
The 2003 CBA also provides in Section 5.A.7 that 
“any Local Working Condition established prior to 
May 20, 2003 that would interfere with the attain­
ment of the workplace restructuring objective” would 
be eliminated and those local working conditions 
unaffected by the workplace restructuring plan “will 
be preserved.” The plaintiffs haven’t alleged or ar­
gued that the local working condition of non-payment 
for changing clothes and showering was eliminated 
because it interfered with USS’s Workplace Restruc­
turing and Productivity Plan or that that local work­
ing condition wasn’t preserved over the effective 
period of the contract.
Plaintiffs say, too, that it isn’t enough that 
an employer has a custom or practice of not paying
practice of not paying for preparatory and closing activities that 
occur outside of the paid shift would remain in effect. In fact, the 
parties to the 2003 [CBA] went even further and provided that 
any then existing local agreement or practice that could dimin­
ish productivity would be terminated and that any new local 
agreement, custom or practice to the contrary had to be in 
writing, signed and approved at the national level. No such 
written agreement has been signed by the parties.” Deft. Memo., 
at 18.
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for time spent on the activities here at issue: use of 
the phrase “a custom or practice under a bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreement” in Section 203(o) 
requires the custom or practice to have a relationship 
with or arise under the auspices of the CBA. The 
plaintiffs contend “[t]he practice need not have been 
memorialized within the text of the CBA, but the 
issue must at least have arisen as part of the CBA 
negotiation process, such that the CBA’s failure to 
address the question can fairly be attributed to the 
union’s decision to acquiesce to the employer’s prac­
tice.” Resp., at 34. Plaintiffs claim that no custom or 
practice can exist under the 2003 CBA as evidenced 
by plaintiff Clifton Sandifer’s statement that “[t]he 
CBA, which governed compensation at the time this 
suit was filed, did not address compensation for the 
activities at issue in this case. Nor was the issue 
discussed during the negotiations leading to that 
contract.” Sandifer Decl.,  ^26. Mr. Sandifer, though, 
hasn’t set forth any information about his personal 
knowledge of the 2003 contract negotiations. He re­
ports that from June 2006 to September 2008 he was 
Chairman of the Civil Rights Committee and in that 
capacity became familiar with the union grievance 
process and some of the grievances filed against USS, 
but he hasn’t stated that he had any involvement in 
the 2003 contracts talks, was a member of the union’s 
bargaining committee in 2003, or personally partici­
pated in or even attended the 2003 negotiation ses­
sions in any capacity. Mr. Sandifer’s unsupported 
statement that “the issue” wasn’t discussed during 
the 2003 contract negotiations, without more, is
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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether a custom or practice exists under the 
2003 CBA. Cf Morrow v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 
F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary 
judgment where affidavit claiming that management 
knew of offensive photographs in the workplace didn’t 
include any specifics about who complained, to whom 
the complaints were made, the nature of the com­
plaints, or how the affiant gained personal knowledge 
of the complaints); Hadley v. County of DuPage, 715 
F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 56 demands 
something more specific than the bald assertion of 
the general truth of a particular matter, rather it 
requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts 
establishing the existence of the truth of the matter 
asserted.”).
Plaintiffs lastly argue that the five-year span of 
the 2003 CBA -  from 2003 to 2008 -  is too short a 
period of time to establish a custom or practice, 
claiming that “a custom or practice in the FLSA 
context may not be found when a history of discord 
exists, as it does here.” Resp., at 36. The plaintiffs cite 
language from Tennessee Coal v. Muscoda, 321 U.S. 
at 602, that “[a] valid custom cannot be based on so 
turbulent and discordant a history; it requires some­
thing more than unilateral and arbitrary imposition 
of working conditions.” They further claim that the 
“issue of compensation for clothes changing need not 
be ‘threshed out’ between the union and the employer
— it is enough the employer was unilaterally refusing
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to pay for the activity at the time the CBA was en­
tered into.” Resp., at 37. But plaintiffs have offered no 
explanation as to the applicability of that language to 
the facts of this case nor have they set forth any 
evidence demonstrating that the issue at hand wasn’t 
“threshed out” between USS and the Union during 
contract negotiations and grievance procedures. See 
Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(court is not required to “scour a record to locate 
evidence supporting a party’s legal argument” nor 
“research and construct the parties’ arguments.”); 
Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake County, 
IL, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the 
parties’ duty to package, present, and support their 
arguments.”).
USS has submitted evidence it says demonstrates 
the parties’ continuing agreement to non-compensation 
for the activities here at issue -  language in the 1947 
Supplemental Agreement; inclusion of that agree­
ment in the 1999 and 2008 CBAs; language in the 
2003 CBA preserving prior local working condition 
agreements (like the 1947 Supplemental Agreement) 
and requiring new local working condition agree­
ments to be in writing (there were none); and a cus­
tom or practice of non-payment for these activities. 
The plaintiffs haven’t challenged USS’s evidence that 
the issue of non-compensation has been addressed 
and agreed to between the company and the union 
since 1947, nor have the plaintiffs presented evidence 
of their own demonstrating a history of what they 
refer to as “unilateral and arbitrary” imposition of
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working conditions, i.e., non-compensation for pre- 
and post-shift activities of changing clothes and 
showering, that would negate the terms of the parties’ 
written agreements or create a genuine issue as to 
whether a custom or practice of non-compensation 
has existed in connection with the parties’ bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreements since 1947. USS has 
carried its burden under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), and the 
company’s summary judgment motion is granted with 
respect to plaintiffs’ claim for compensation for time 
spent donning and doffing PPE and showering.
B. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) -  Portal-to-Portal Act
USS next claims the plaintiffs’ claims are barred 
under the Portal-to-Portal Act, which exempts em­
ployers from paying employees for (1) “walking, 
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of 
performance of the principal activity or activities” the 
employee was hired to perform and (2) engaging in 
activities that are “preliminary to or postliminary to 
[the employee’s] principal activity or activities” if 
those activities occur either prior to the commence­
ment of or subsequent to ceasing of the principal 
activity or activities on any particular workday. 29 
U.S.C. § 254(a). “Principal activity” isn’t defined in 
the statute, but the term has been interpreted as in­
cluding all activities that are an “integral and indis­
pensable part of the principal activities” for which the 
employees are employed. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 
247, 252-253 (1956). “To be ‘integral and indispens­
able,’ an activity must be necessary to the principal
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work performed and done for the benefit of the em­
ployer.” Alvarez v. IBP, 339 F.3d at 902-903. “In 
contrast to integral and indispensable activities, 
preliminary or postliminary activities are activities 
spent predominantly in the employees’ own inter­
ests.” Jerzak v. City of South Bend, 996 F. Supp. 840, 
848 (N.D. Ind. 1998). “The test, therefore, to deter­
mine which activities are ‘principal’ and which are ‘an 
integral and indispensable part’ of such activities, is 
not whether the activities in question are uniquely 
related to the predominant activity of the business, 
but whether they are performed as part of the regular 
work of the employees in the ordinary course of 
business.” Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 
400-401 (5th Cir. 1976); see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) 
(“No categorical list o f ‘preliminary’ and ‘postliminary’ 
activities . . . can be made, since activities which 
under one set of circumstances may be ‘preliminary’ 
or ‘postliminary’ may under other conditions be ‘prin­
cipal’ activities.”). USS’s arguments will be addressed 
separately.10
10 USS also argued that the plaintiffs’ walking time is non­
compensable pursuant to the terms of the applicable CBA, a fact 
the company says the court “should weigh -  heavily” because the 
“Portal-to-Portal Act expressly requires consideration of the 
parties’ collective bargaining agreements to determine whether 
employers must pay employees for preliminary and/or post­
liminary activities.” Reply, at 16. This argument was raised for 
the first time in USS’s reply brief, so the company’s argument in 
this regard is waived. See United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 
767, 769 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the defendant has waived this argu­
ment because he presented it for the first time in his reply 
(Continued on following page)
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1. Interaction with 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)
USS’s first argument is that donning and doffing 
PPE and showering can’t be considered principal ac­
tivities because those activities are non-compensable 
under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). USS says changing clothes 
and showering aren’t parts of employees’ measured 
working time, so the activities don’t start or end the 
workday and can’t be considered principal activities. 
Thus, USS says, walking to and from the locker 
rooms doesn’t occur after the beginning of the first 
principal activity of the day or before the end of the 
last principal activity, rendering that walking time 
non-compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. USS 
says its position is supported by the Department of 
Labor’s opinion that
In promulgating [§ 203(o)] Congress plainly 
excluded activities covered by section [203(o)] 
from time that would otherwise be ‘hours 
worked.’ Accordingly, activities covered by 
section [203(o)] cannot be considered princi­
pal activities and do not start the workday. 
Walking time after a [§ 203(o)] activity is 
therefore not compensable unless it is pre­
ceded by a principal activity.
DOL Opinion Letter FLSA 2007-10, 2007 WL 
2066454, at *1 (May 14, 2007).
brief”); Hart v. Transit Mgmt. of Racine, Inc., 426 F.3d 863, 867 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“Arguments that first appear in a reply brief are 
deemed waived.”).
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Courts are to afford consideration to agency 
opinion letters interpreting the statutory provisions 
within the agency’s area of expertise, see Skidmore u. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[T]he rulings, 
interpretations and opinions of the [DOL] under [the 
FLSA], while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment as to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”); 
CenTra, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and South­
west Areas Pension Fund, 578 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 
2009) (“Opinion letters are not entitled to Chevron 
deference, or even the deference we accord an agen­
cy’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation,
. . . but opinion letters are ‘entitled to respect . . .  to 
the extent that [they] have the power to persuade.’ ”
0quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 
587 (2000)), but, in this instance, the DOL’s 2007 
FLSA Opinion Letter provides little guidance on the 
reason(s) for the agency’s conclusion on this issue. 
The court finds more persuasive the conclusion of 
the Figas court that “the character of donning and 
doffing activities is not dependent upon whether 
such activities are excluded pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement.” Figas v. Horsehead Corp., 
No. 06-1344, 2008 WL 4170043, at *20 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 3, 2008) (emphasis in original). “Section 203(o) 
relates to the compensability of time spent donning, 
doffing, and washing in the collective bargaining 
process. It does not render such time any more or less 
integral or indispensable to an employee’s job.” 
Andrako v. USS, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (emphasis in
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original). Accepting USS’s argument and the conclu­
sion of the Opinion Letter on this issue would neces­
sarily “expand § 203(o)’s exclusion beyond donning, 
doffing and washing time to include post-donning and 
pre-doffing travel time, which is not mentioned 
therein.” Figas v. Horsehead Corp., 2008 WL 4170043, 
at *20. The court can’t conclude as a matter of law 
that the non-compensability of donning, doffing, 
and showering activities under 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) 
excludes consideration of whether, pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 254(a), those activities are an integral and 
indispensable part of employees’ principal activities 
at USS. Contra Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1011 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (concluding 
that “once an activity has been deemed a section 
[203(o)] activity, it cannot be considered a principal 
activity. This finding is in accordance with the 2007 
DOL opinion letter, which the court has already 
determined worthy of deference, stating that a sec­
tion [203(o)] activity is not a principal activity. . . . 
Therefore, to avoid the preclusive effect of the combi­
nation of section [203(o)] and the continuous workday 
rule, plaintiffs must show that their claimed activi­
ties are themselves either principal activities or are 
integral or indispensable to a principal activity.”).
2. Integral and Indispensable
USS next asserts that the activities here at issue
— donning and doffing, showering, and the laundering 
of employees’ personal clothing -  aren’t “integral 
and indispensable” parts of the employees’ principal
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activities because those activities aren’t necessary to 
employees’ performance of their principal activities 
and aren’t undertaken for the sole benefit of the 
company. The company’s arguments relating to each 
activity will be addressed separately.
(a) Donning and Doffing of PPE
USS says that based on differing job assignments 
within the plant, not all employees are required to 
wear PPE -  for example, as a Bander in the Hot Roll 
finishing department, plaintiff Alvin Mitchell wasn’t 
required to wear greens, although he chose to do so. 
See Burton Decl.,  ^3 [App. 339-340]. USS says, too, 
that wearing greens isn’t necessary to the perfor­
mance of the principal activities of certain jobs — for 
example, wearing greens isn’t necessary for plaintiffs 
Dora Anderson and Kenny Williams to monitor 
temperatures and opacity gauges in their positions as 
Heaters in the Coke Plant, even though, USS notes, 
wearing greens was required for that position. Deft. 
Memo., at 25. USS asserts that even though wearing 
PPE at Gary Works unquestionably advances the 
company’s core value of maintaining a safe work 
environment, “that interest is not for the exclusive 
benefit of the employer. Wearing greens clearly serves 
the mutual interest of the employer and the employee 
to avoid accidents and to work in the safest environ­
ment possible.” Deft. Memo., at 26. USS maintains 
that donning and doffing of generic work clothes isn’t 
an integral and indispensable part of principal activi­
ties at the plant because the donning and doffing of
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PPE isn’t necessary to the principal work performed 
by employees and isn’t done for the sole benefit of the 
company. Donning and doffing, USS concludes, are 
preliminary and postliminary activities and, there­
fore, walking from the locker rooms to the employees’ 
place of principal activity and back to the locker room 
after employees cease their principal activities is not 
compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Plaintiffs respond that donning and doffing PPE 
is integral and indispensable to the principal work 
activities at the plant: they insist they wear PPE 
because doing so is required by USS and OSHA and 
the use of PPE “prevents workplace injuries, which 
would severely impeded [sic] USS’s business.” Resp., 
at 44. The plaintiffs, though, haven’t challenged USS’s 
claim that some job assignments don’t require em­
ployees to wear PPE, that wearing PPE isn’t neces­
sary for some employees to perform their jobs, or that 
the wearing of PPE serves the mutual safety interests 
of the company and the employees. Plaintiffs cite 
Coke Plant regulations relating to the wearing of 
flame-retardant clothing, see Resp., at 38-39 (citing to 
“29 CFR § 1910.1029 et al.”), but haven’t referenced 
specific USS rules or OHSA regulations that address 
the PPE they are required to wear. The plaintiffs cite 
generally to USS handbooks and safety manuals -  for 
example, plaintiffs set forth the booklet explaining 
USS’s Personal Protective Equipment Program, which 
provides that management personnel must assure 
that “affected employees use PPE,” at p. 1 (emphasis 
in original), “[ajffected employees shall wear the
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required PPE for the area(s) where they are work­
ing,” at p. 2 (emphasis in original), and “[a]fter train­
ing, affected employees will be able to independently 
determine when and what PPE is necessary in their 
normal workplace,” at 3 (emphasis in original), see 
Walton Decl., Exh. B -  but they haven’t pointed to 
specific provisions of those materials that designate 
the PPE they are required to wear or explained how 
the PPE they wear is necessary to their performance 
of their job tasks.
The changing of clothes is integral and indispen­
sable to an employee’s principal activities if the 
donning is “necessary to the principal work performed 
and done for the benefit of the employer.” Alvarez v. 
IBP, 339 F.3d at 903; see also Armour & Co. v. 
Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (‘Whether time is 
spent predominantly for the employer’s benefit or for 
the employee’s is a question dependent upon all the 
circumstances of the case.”); Ballaris v. Wacker 
Siltronic Corp., 370 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(changing clothes may be considered integral and 
indispensable “where the changing of clothes on the 
employer’s premises is required by law, by rules of 
the employer, or by the nature of the work”). The 
parties’ evidence establishes that Coke Plant employ­
ees are required to wear PPE, and USS has set forth 
evidence that at least one plaintiff not working in the 
Coke Plant isn’t required to wear PPE and the re­
quirement to wear PPE isn’t vital to the performance 
of at least one job assignment in the Coke Plant. But 
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to
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the plaintiffs as the court is required to do at this 
stage of the proceedings, the court concludes that 
USS hasn’t established that the donning and doffing 
of PPE isn’t an integral and indispensable part of the 
principal activities at USS. The court agrees with 
USS that the safety advantages associated with the 
wearing of PPE is of mutual benefit to the company 
and the plaintiffs; however, a reasonable fact-finder 
could conclude that the donning and doffing of PPE is 
necessary to the principal work performed by the 
plaintiffs. The company’s request for summary judg­
ment on this issue is denied.
(b) Showering
USS maintains the company has no requirement 
that employees working in areas other than the Coke 
Plant must shower at the end of their shifts and those 
who do shower before leaving the plant do so for their 
own convenience. USS says the applicable CBAs 
contain a recognition of the shower requirement for 
Coke Plant employees and the parties’ agreement 
that those employees are to be afforded time to 
shower before the end of their paid shifts, but “[e]x- 
cept for employees at the Coke Plant, there is no 
requirement whatsoever that any employee wash up 
or shower after the end of his shift. While U.S. Steel 
does provide and maintain numerous wash houses 
and locker rooms throughout the plant, whether an 
employee elects to wash up or shower is the employ­
ee’s decision and for his own convenience.” Kolb Dec., 
‘U 48.
69a
USS sets forth additional statements by supervi­
sory employees relating to showering requirements at 
the plant:
-  Declaration of Donald G. Ramsey, Jr. that 
there is no showering requirement for people 
holding position of Stock Unloader on Hi-Line, 
including plaintiff Nicole Andrews; Mr. Ramsey 
reports he’s been working at USS since 1998 and 
is currently a Process Coordinator on the Hi- 
Line. See Deft. App. 370-371.
-  Declaration of James Lash, who has 
worked at USS since 1998, is currently Steel Co­
ordinator on No. 1 BOP, and says there’s no re­
quirement that Pit Utility employees, like 
plaintiff Bernard Jenkins, shower at the end of 
their shifts. See Deft. App. 349-353.
-  Declaration of Nicholas Furdeck, who be­
came employed at USS in 1998, is the current Pit 
Coordinator and Interim Area Manager for the 
Q-BOP, and says that USS has no requirement 
for employees at the Q-BOP, like plaintiff Ber­
nard Jenkins, to shower at the end of their shifts. 
See Deft. App. 341-347.
-  Declaration of Michael Burton, who has 
worked at USS since 1999 and was Shift Man­
ager at EGL until December 2007 when he became 
Shift Manager at South Sheet Metal Warehouse, 
and says there’s no requirement that employees 
at EGL, like plaintiff Alvin Mitchell, shower at 
the end of their shifts. See Deft. App. 339-340.
-  Declaration of Gregory Olson that USS 
has no requirement that employees working as
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Banders and Diesel Burners, like plaintiff Alvin 
Mitchell, shower before they leave the plant; Mr. 
Olson reports he began working at USS in 2000 
and is currently Shift Manager in Hot Roll Fin­
ishing. See Deft. App. 355-358.
— Declaration of David Best, who began 
employment at USS in 1994, is currently Hot 
Strip Mill Coordinator, and states that there’s no 
requirement that employees, like plaintiff Clifton 
Sandifer, who work in the Hot Strip Mill shower 
at the end of their shifts. See Deft. App. 334-338.
USS concludes that because showering isn’t required 
and inures to the benefit of the employees, that ac­
tivity isn’t an integral and indispensable part of em­
ployees’ principal activities and is non-compensable 
time under the Portal-to-Portal Act.
While plaintiffs claim that showering is “manda­
tory” under USS policies and OHSA requirements 
and the requirement for them to shower before they 
leave the plant benefits the company, they have 
produced no evidence to support their claim nor have 
they challenged the statements of USS supervisory 
personnel that no showering requirement exists out­
side the Coke Plant. Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements, 
without more, are insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact relating to the issue of shower­
ing.
USS has presented evidence sufficient to estab­
lish that, with the exception of Coke Plant employees, 
showering isn’t otherwise required by the company 
and shower facilities are located in the locker rooms
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at the plant for the convenience of the employees. 
The court concludes that showering constitutes a 
postliminary activity under 29 U.S.C. § 254 for which 
USS isn’t required to compensate its employees. USS 
is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
(c) Laundering Personal Clothing
USS also asserts that the plaintiffs aren’t enti­
tled to be paid for time spent transporting and laun­
dering the personal clothing they wear under their 
PPE because that time doesn’t qualify as “work” and 
so is not compensable under the FLSA. USS says the 
plaintiffs’ washing of their personal clothing isn’t 
“necessarily and primarily for the benefit” of the 
company, USS derives no benefit from employees 
wearing clean personal clothing under their PPE, and 
USS has no requirement that employees’ personal 
clothing be laundered or cleaned.
Because the term “washing” as used in Section 
203(o) can’t be seen as including laundering clothes, 
see Burks v. Equity Group-Eufaula Div., LLC, 571 
F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243-1244 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (noting 
that “the vast majority of cases that have specifically 
discussed ‘washing’ in the context of § 203(o) have 
done so only in the context of washing one’s body” and 
“the legislative history of 203(o) indicates that the 
term ‘washing’ was intended to be limited to cleaning 
the person”); Saunders v. John Morrel & Co., No. 
C88-4143, 1991 WL 529542, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 24, 
1991) (same), USS is entitled to summary judgment
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only if the plaintiffs’ laundering activity can be ex­
cluded from coverage as a “preliminary or post­
liminary” activity under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). Thus, 
the court must determine whether plaintiffs’ launder­
ing of their personal items of clothing is (I) required 
by USS, (ii) necessary for the plaintiffs to perform 
their duties, and (iii) primarily for the benefit of USS. 
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340,
1344 (11th Cir. 2007); Jerzak v. City of South Bend, 
996 F. Supp. 840, 848 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
The plaintiffs claim that their laundering of 
personal work clothes is compensable under the 
FLSA in reliance on Bull u. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 
212 (Fed. Cl. 2005), where the court held that off-duty 
laundering of canine training towels was of benefit to 
the employer and integral and indispensable to the 
canine handlers’ job duties. Plaintiffs say USS dic­
tates the type of clothing they must wear under their 
PPE and the methods they must use to launder that 
clothing; they say, too, that OSHA regulations, e.g. 29 
C.F.R. § 1910.1018, require USS to provide for the 
cleaning of chemically contaminated clothing, “includ­
ing shoes and underwear.”11 The plaintiffs maintain
11 The plaintiffs cite generally to 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018, 
which relates to “occupational exposures to inorganic arsenic” 
and outlines the obligations of employers in maintaining work­
places where such exposure might occur. The plaintiffs haven’t 
specified any applicable section(s), but upon examination of the 
regulation, the court found the following references to the care 
of clothing for employees working in affected areas: employers 
are required to provide employees working in regulated areas 
(Continued on following page)
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their clothing is regularly contaminated with chemi­
cals so USS benefits directly by requiring them to 
personally launder that clothing.
Plaintiffs’ laundering claim relates to the per­
sonal items of clothing they wear each day.12 The 
plaintiffs first say that USS dictates the clothing they 
must wear under their PPE, as well as the manner in 
which they must launder that clothing, and that 
transporting and laundering of those personal items 
of clothing “is done under the express direction of
with protective work clothing and equipment; launder that pro­
tective clothing “at least weekly,” repair or replace protective 
clothing as needed; assure that contaminated protective clothing 
is placed in a closed container in the changing rooms; inform any 
person who cleans or launders the protective clothing of the 
harmful effects of exposure to inorganic arsenic; prohibit the 
removal of inorganic arsenic from protective clothing by shaking 
or blowing; provide changing rooms with separate storage fa­
cilities for street clothes and protective clothing; and provide 
facilities for employees to vacuum their protective clothing and 
shoes before entering other areas of the workplace. See § 1910.1018(j), 
(m). 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 contains no requirement that an 
employer affected by this section provide laundering services for 
employees’ personal clothing or reimburse employees for laun­
dering their personal clothing.
12 While the plaintiffs say USS provides employees with 
instructions on how to clean the flame retardant PPE and claim 
the company “required employees to launder their contaminated 
PPE in a certain manner,” Stmt, of Genuine Issues, U 8, the 
record establishes that USS supplies, maintains, and launders 
the flame retardant PPE worn by all employees. The plaintiffs 
have presented no evidence to support a finding that they are or 
were required to launder the flame retardant PPE supplied by 
the company.
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USS,” citing to unidentified sections of Exhibits 1-37. 
But unlike the situation in Bull v. United States 
where the evidence -  specific portions of a handbook 
and a written memo — established that the canine 
training towels were required to be properly cleaned 
“after each use,” 68 Fed. Cl. at 238, the plaintiffs’ 
conclusory statements in Exhibits 1-37, without cita­
tion to any evidence that would support their claims, 
that they are “required” by USS to transport and 
launder their personal clothing, are insufficient to 
establish that USS requires its employees to launder 
their personal clothing. See Ammons v. Aramark 
Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-818 (7th Cir. 
2004) (“Citations to an entire transcript of a deposi­
tion or to a lengthy exhibit are not specific and are, 
accordingly, inappropriate. A court should not be 
expected to review a lengthy record for facts that a 
party could have easily identified with greater par­
ticularity.”). The plaintiffs have provided no support 
for their conclusory statement that USS “directly 
benefits by requiring plaintiffs to take home and 
launder” their personal clothing, and they haven’t 
alleged or argued that the transporting and launder­
ing of their personal clothing is necessary for them to 
perform their duties.
USS provides employees with PPE, flame retard­
ant apparel that the company launders and maintains. 
The company's Gary Works “Personal Protective Equip­
ment Program” manual states that personal clothing 
worn beneath the PPE “should be 100% cotton” and 
directs that no synthetic material clothing, e.g.,
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nylon, dacron, rayon, polyester, etc., be worn under 
the PPE because such material will “burn at lower 
temperatures, melt and stick to the skin.” The “Gen­
eral Safety and Plant Conduct” manual instructs that 
work clothing shouldn’t be laundered or washed “in 
flammable liquids, such as gasoline, kerosene, or 
similar fluids, as the cloth may retain a part of the 
solution and become highly flammable,” and further 
advises that flame-retardant clothing “should be 
cleaned by washing, using normal wash, rinse and 
drying cycles at normal temperatures, and using a 
normal household detergent as the cleansing agent, 
[and] to avoid impairing the flame-resistant proper­
ties, such clothing should never be boiled or steam 
cleaned, and solvents or bleaches should never be 
used.”
While employees at Gary Works are prohibited 
from wearing items of personal clothing that would 
“melt and stick to the skin” and are provided with 
information about how to safely launder their per­
sonal work clothes and any flame-retardant clothing 
they might choose to wear under the company- 
provided PPE, neither that prohibition nor the ac­
companying safety instructions transform the trans­
porting and laundering of plaintiffs’ personal clothing 
into a requirement of USS that is necessary for the 
plaintiffs to perform their duties or that is primarily 
for the benefit of USS. USS is entitled to summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs’ laundering claim.
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C. Time Expended is De Minimis
USS maintains the time spent by the plaintiffs 
donning and doffing PPE and walking to and from 
the job site is de minimis and not compensable under 
the FLSA. “Because defendant seeks to rely on an 
exception to the rule, it is the defendant’s burden to 
prove that the exception applies.” Spoerle v. Kraft 
Foods Global, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (W.D. 
Wis. 2007).
“The de minimis doctrine permits employers to 
disregard, for purposes of the FLSA, otherwise com­
pensable work ‘[w]hen the matter in issue concerns 
only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the 
scheduled working hours. It is only when an em­
ployee is required to give up a substantial measure of 
his time and effort that compensable working time is 
involved.’ ” Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361, 
370-371 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946)). De­
termination of whether the de minimis exception is 
applicable requires the court to examine four factors. 
Hoyt v. Ellsworth Co-op. Creamery, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1132, 1138 (W.D. Wis. 2008). The first factor is “the 
amount of daily time spent on the additional work;” 
the second is “the practical administrative difficulty 
of recording the additional time;” the third is “the 
aggregate amount of compensable time;” and the final 
factor is “the regularity of the additional work.” 
“Although many courts have found daily periods of 
approximately 10 minutes to be de minimis, no rigid 
rule using mathematical certainty should be applied.
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Instead common sense must be applied to the facts 
of each case.” Hoyt v. Ellsworth Creamery, 579 
F. Supp. 2d at 1138; see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.47 (“In 
recording working time under the Act, insubstantial 
or insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled 
working hours, which cannot as a practical adminis­
trative matter be precisely recorded for payroll pur­
poses, may be disregarded. The courts have held that 
such trifles are de minimis. . . . This rule applies only 
where there are uncertain and indefinite periods of 
time involved of a few seconds or minutes duration, 
and where the failure to count such time is due to 
considerations justified by industrial realities. An 
employer may not arbitrarily fail to count as hours 
worked any part, however small, of the employee’s 
fixed or regular working time or practically ascer­
tainable period of time he is regularly required to 
spend on duties assigned to him.”).
With respect to the amount of daily time expended, 
USS says donning the required PPE takes approxi­
mately 2 minutes, 40 seconds, as demonstrated in its 
video presentation submitted as Exhibit 1 to Raul 
Arana’s Declaration [Deft. App. 323-333]. USS says 
while the walking distances from locker rooms to 
work locations “vary widely,” estimates are between 1 
minute, 38 seconds and 8 minutes. Deft. Memo., at 
30. USS notes, too, that walking times are often 
reduced when employees are allowed to walk back to 
the locker rooms during their paid shifts. Doffing 
work clothes is alleged to take even less time than 
putting them on. Deft. Memo., at 30.
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USS claims difficulty would arise under the 
second factor if the company had to record the addi­
tional time. USS contends that “[t]he time employees 
spend engaging in all of these pre- and post-shift 
activities cannot be administratively tracked. Em­
ployees are paid by shift, and customs and practices 
are prevalent throughout the plant pursuant to which 
employees are permitted, when the production or 
work schedule permits, to leave the work station 
early such that some doffing, walking, and washing 
will occur prior to the end of their paid shifts.” Deft. 
Memo., at 30. USS has set forth affidavit statements 
that the time spent on these pre- and post-shift 
activities “varied by day and by employee. This is a 
personality driven thing. Some guys like to get to 
work early and read the paper. Some guys like to 
walk slow and chat with friends. It just varies.” Lash 
Decl., % 7 [Deft. App. 351].
USS maintains the aggregate amount of time 
expended is de minimis. According to the company, 
“[t]he variations among employees and units, and 
generally the small amounts of time expended pre 
and post shift, make each of these activities de 
minimis and, thus, non-compensable.” Deft. Memo., 
at 30-31. And while USS didn’t address the last fac­
tor, the additional time expended on donning, doffing, 
and walking is clearly “regular.”
The plaintiffs argue in response that the de 
minimis rule “applies to the aggregate amount of 
time for which an employee seeks compensation, not 
separately to each discrete activity.” Resp., at 48.
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According to the plaintiffs, donning, doffing, and 
walking are all principal activities covered by the 
FLSA, so the measurement of time must be in the 
aggregate for purposes of the de minimis doctrine — 
“work cannot be parsed into discrete activities for 
measurement.” Resp., at 48. Plaintiffs say their 
position is supported by the DOL’s Wage and Hour 
Advisory Memorandum No. 2006-2, dated May 31, 
2006, which interprets the decision in IBP, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), as “clearly standing] for 
the proposition that where the aggregate time spent 
donning, walking, waiting, and doffing exceeds the 
de minimis standard, it is compensable. Any other 
conclusion would be inconsistent with the continuous 
workday rule.” Pltf. Exh. 39, at 4. Plaintiffs have also 
offered suggestions of ways USS might better meas­
ure the time spent by employees on these activities so 
employees could be compensated on a weekly basis 
for the time. See Resp., at 50.
The parties seem to agree that the time spent on 
these activities varies from person to person and from 
activity to activity, but they offer widely differing 
estimates as to the amount of time required to com­
plete the activities and dispute the feasibility of 
measuring that time for purposes of determining the 
amount of compensation that might be required. 
Questions of fact preclude summary judgment on this 
issue.
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D. Mandatory CBA Grievance and Arbitration 
Procedures
USS lastly moves for summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs’ claims because, the company says, all 
disputes arising under the CBA must be resolved 
through the procedures set forth in the CBA. USS 
says the “Adjustment of Grievances” section of the
2003 CBA provides a specific three-step grievance 
procedure that must be employed to settle “any dif­
ferences . . . between [USS] and the Union as to the 
interpretation or application of, or compliance with, 
the provisions of this or any other Agreement be­
tween [USS] and the Union.” Deft. App. 111-131.
This same argument was considered and rejected 
earlier this year by the court in Andrako v. USS, 632 
F. Supp. 2d at 414, and that court’s conclusion is 
equally applicable here: “Plaintiffs’ claim for com­
pensation for walking time does not rest on an in­
terpretation of the underlying collective bargaining 
agreement. Rather, plaintiffs argue that regardless of 
what the collective bargaining agreement provides, 
the FLSA entitles them to compensation for post- 
donning and pre-doffing walking time as a matter of 
law. This is a question of statutory, not contractual, 
interpretation.” USS’s request for summary judgment 
based on the grievance and arbitration procedures of 
the applicable CBA is denied.
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Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS IN 
PART and DENIES IN PART the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment [docket # 82] in the following 
particulars:
(a) USS’s request for judgment pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) with respect to plaintiffs’ 
claim for compensation for donning and doff­
ing PPE and showering is GRANTED;
(b) USS’s request for judgment pursu­
ant to 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) is
(1) GRANTED with respect to 
plaintiffs’ claims related to shower­
ing and laundering, and
(2) DENIED with respect to 
plaintiffs’ claim related to walking 
time;
(c) USS’s request for judgment based 
on the de minimis doctrine is DENIED; and
(d) USS’s request for judgment pursu­
ant to the grievance and arbitration proce­
dures of the applicable CBA is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 15. 2009
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr._______
Chief Judge
United States District Court
IV. Co nclusion
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United States Court of Appeals 
For the Seventh Circuit 
Chicago, Illinois 60604
June 11, 2012
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RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
Nos. 10-1821, 10-1866
CLIFTON SANDIFER, 
et al.,
Plaintiffs -Appellees/
Cross Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendant Appellant/
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ORDER
On May 22, 2012, plaintiffs-appellees/cross- 
appellants filed a petition for rehearing en banc. All of 
the judges on the original panel have voted to deny 
the petition, and none of the active judges has re­
quested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. 
The petition is therefore DENIED.
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